668 S.E.2d 217
6. The general rule of statutory construction requires that a specific
statute be given precedence over a general statute relating to the same subject matter where
the two cannot be reconciled. Syllabus point 1, UMWA by Trumka v. Kingdon, 174 W. Va.
330, 325 S.E.2d 120 (1984).
7. It is always presumed that the legislature will not enact a meaningless or useless statute. Syllabus point 4, State ex rel. Hardesty v. Aracoma-Chief Logan No. 4523, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Inc., 147 W. Va. 645, 129 S.E.2d 921 (1963).
8. Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7) (1961) (Repl. Vol. 2002), the terms employee and workman, as used in the West Virginia Prevailing Wage Act, W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1, et seq., do not include workers who are (1) employed or hired by a public authority on a regular basis, (2) employed or hired by a public authority on a temporary basis, (3) employed or hired by a public authority to perform temporary repairs, or (4) employed or hired by a public authority to perform emergency repairs.
9. W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2 (1961) (Repl. Vol. 2002) requires the prevailing wage to be paid to all workmen who are employed on behalf of any public authority and who are engaged in the construction of public improvements. To the
extent that our prior holding in Syllabus point 3 of Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation v. University of West Virginia Board of Trustees, 210 W. Va. 456, 557 S.E.2d 863 (2001), is inconsistent with this holding, it is expressly modified.
The petitioner herein, the Tucker County Solid Waste Authority (hereinafter TCSWA), requests this Court to issue a writ of prohibition against the respondent herein, the West Virginia Division of Labor (hereinafter DOL), to prevent the DOL from continuing administrative proceedings against it. Specifically, the TCSWA wishes to prohibit the enforcement of a DOL administrative order, entered June 29, 2007, which found the TCSWA did not pay certain temporary workers the prevailing wage and thus owes said workers additional wages and damages in the approximate amount of $199,760.30. In its petition to this Court, the TCSWA requests that we prohibit the enforcement of the hearing examiner's order because, as alleged by the TCSWA, (1) the prevailing wage was improperly applied to employees of a public authority; (2) the prevailing wage was improperly applied to work that was never let to contract; and (3) the legislative history of the West Virginia Prevailing Wage Act (hereinafter the Act), W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1, et seq., was not given deference. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the record presented for consideration, and the pertinent authorities, we find that the TCSWA was not required to pay the prevailing wage to the workers involved in this case and, accordingly, grant the requested writ of prohibition.
Thereafter, the TCSWA requested and was granted an informal conference with the DOL to explain why it believed the West Virginia Prevailing Wage Act (Act) did not apply to its hiring of temporary workers to complete the excavation portion of the landfill expansion project. This meeting occurred on June 15, 2004, but no resolution was reached. Approximately nine months later, on March 8, 2005, the DOL determined that an additional TCSWA employee should have been paid the prevailing wage for his work on the landfill expansion project. Therefore, the DOL increased the total wages due and owing from the TCSWA to $99,880.15, or $199,760.30 with the addition of the like amount of damages for this sum.
Ultimately, the DOL referred the matter to a hearing examiner, who issued Preliminary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order as to Further Proceedings, on June 29, 2007. In an attempt to reconcile the various provisions of the Act, the hearing examiner concluded that the Act was intended to apply to contracts of employment entered into by public authorities with persons for the specific purpose of such persons being engaged in the construction of public improvements, unless such work is for the specific purpose of making temporary or emergency repairs. Insofar as the landfill expansion project was neither a temporary nor an emergency repair, the hearing examiner reasoned that the Act applied and that the temporary workers the TCSWA had hired to complete the excavation work thereon should have been paid the prevailing wage. Additionally, the hearing examiner determined that further evidentiary proceedings would be necessary to finally resolve the dispute. Among the areas identified by the hearing examiner as requiring further factual development were the precise nature and type of the employment of the workers involved herein; whether the penalty provisions of W. Va. Code § 21-5A-9(b) applied to a direct employer scenario; and whether, if the penalty provisions did apply, the honest mistake exception of W. Va. Code § 21-5A-9(b) would relieve the TCSWA of liability for the prevailing wages not paid.
Following these rulings, the TCSWA filed a petition for writ of prohibition with this Court seeking to prohibit the further evidentiary proceedings recommended by the hearing examiner. By order entered January 10, 2008, this Court issued a rule to show cause. Thereafter, the West Virginia State Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO (hereinafter Trades Council), moved to intervene as a party respondent in this proceeding and was granted intervenor status by order entered February 13, 2008. In addition, the Kanawha Valley Builders Association (hereinafter Association) moved for leave to appear in the case as Amicus Curiae; this Court granted the Association's motion by order entered February 13, 2008. (See footnote 5)
In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving the absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.
Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996). Moreover, we have stated that prohibition . . . against judges [is a] drastic and extraordinary remed[y]. . . . As [an] extraordinary remed[y], [it] [is] reserved for really extraordinary causes. State ex rel. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194 W. Va. 431, 436, 460 S.E.2d 677, 682 (1995) (citations omitted). Thus,
[i]n determining whether to grant a rule to show cause in prohibition when a court is not acting in excess of its jurisdiction, this Court will look to the adequacy of other available remedies such as appeal and to the over-all economy of effort and money among litigants, lawyers and courts; however, this Court will use prohibition in this discretionary way to correct only substantial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in contravention of a clear statutory, constitutional, or common law mandate which may be resolved independently of any disputed facts and only in cases where there is a high probability that the trial will be completely reversed if the error is not corrected in advance.
Syl. pt. 1, Hinkle v. Black, 164 W. Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979). Guided by these principles, we proceed to consider the parties' arguments.
The crux of the parties' arguments on this point is a dispute as to the proper interpretation of the applicable statutory law, specifically the statute explaining the purpose of the Act, W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2, and the statute providing definitions for the terms used in the Act, W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1. As with any matter involving the interpretation and application of statutes, we first must determine the Legislature's intent in promulgating the statutory law at issue. The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). We then examine the precise words chosen by the Legislature in adopting the statute. A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect. Syl. pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951). Accord DeVane v. Kennedy, 205 W. Va. 519, 529, 519 S.E.2d 622, 632 (1999) (Where the language of a statutory provision is plain, its terms should be applied as written and not construed. (citations omitted)); Syl. pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959) (When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute.). Where, however, the statutory language is not plain, its language must be construed before it can be applied: [a] statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied. Syl. pt. 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 186 W. Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Ohio County Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W. Va. 552, 301 S.E.2d 183 (1983) (Judicial interpretation of a statute is warranted only if the statute is ambiguous and the initial step in such interpretative inquiry is to ascertain the legislative intent.).
In W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2, the Legislature has definitively stated the public policy underlying the Prevailing Wage Act:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of West Virginia that a wage of no less than the prevailing hourly rate of wages for work of a similar character in the locality in this State in which the construction is performed, shall be paid to all workmen employed by or on behalf of any public authority engaged in the construction of public improvements.
We previously considered this legislative purpose in Affiliated Construction Trades
Foundation v. University of West Virginia Board of Trustees, 210 W. Va. 456, 557 S.E.2d
863 (2001) (hereinafter ACT Foundation). In ACT Foundation, a private entity performed
construction work on behalf of the West Virginia University Foundation (hereinafter the
Foundation). As with the instant proceeding, the prevailing wage was not paid to the
workers performing said construction because the private entity believed that it was exempt
from the Act. (See footnote 13) And also like the case sub judice, a dispute arose as to whether the
prevailing wage should have been paid to said workers. In finding that the Act did not
apply because the Foundation was a private entity that was exempt from the prevailing
wage statutes, this Court held that, [u]nder West Virginia Code § 21-5A-2 (1961) (Repl.
Vol. 1996), the provisions concerning prevailing wages can only be invoked when a
construction project that constitutes a public improvement and which involves workers
employed by or on behalf of a public authority is involved. Syl. pt. 3, 210 W. Va. 456, 557
S.E.2d 863. The Court then went on to analyze those definitional sections of the Act
pertaining to the terms public improvement and public authority in concluding that the
Foundation was exempt from the requirements of the Act. See Syl. pts. 4-6, id.
Although instructive as to the meaning of the general legislative purpose expressed in W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2 and the terms public improvement and public authority, our holding in ACT Foundation does not resolve the specific quandary presented by the facts of the instant proceeding: reconciling the definition of employee, which specifically exempts public authority employees from the prevailing wage requirement, with the purpose of the Act, which specifically applies the prevailing wage requirement to public authority employees. The parties to this proceeding do not dispute that the TCSWA is a public authority for purposes of the Act. See W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(1). (See footnote 14) See also W. Va. Code § 22C-4-3 (2000) (Repl. Vol. 2005). (See footnote 15) They also concede that the landfill expansion project was neither a temporary nor an emergency repair. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the Act required the TCSWA to pay the workers involved in this case the prevailing wage for the work they performed on the landfill expansion project.
The DOL contends that the Act specifically includes a public authority's workers in its requirement that public authorities pay their workers the prevailing wage:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of West Virginia that a wage of no less than the prevailing hourly rate of wages for work of a similar character in the locality in this State in which the construction is performed, shall be paid to all workmen employed by or on behalf of any public authority engaged in the construction of public improvements. W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2 (1961) (Repl. Vol. 2002) (emphasis added). (See footnote 16) Despite this directory language requiring a public authority's workers to be paid the prevailing wage, the TCSWA asserts that it was not required to pay its workers the prevailing wage because the Act's definitional section specifically excludes the workers of a public authority from the definition of employee:
The term employee for the purposes of this article, shall not be construed to include[ (See footnote 17) ] such persons as are employed or hired by the public authority on a regular or temporary basis or engaged in making temporary or emergency repairs.
W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7) (1961) (Repl. Vol. 2002) (emphasis and footnote added). From these quoted statutory passages, it is apparent that these two statutes are in direct conflict and must be construed to resolve this ambiguity. See Sizemore v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 202 W. Va. 591, 596, 505 S.E.2d 654, 659 (1998) (A statute is open to construction only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
When two statutes address the same subject matter, we first attempt to construe the statutes in pari materia to give effect to the full intent and meaning of both legislative enactments. Statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments. Syl. pt. 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361. Even where two statutes are in apparent conflict, the Court must, if reasonably possible, construe such statutes so as to give effect to each. Syl. pt. 4, in part, State ex rel. Graney v. Sims, 144 W. Va. 72, 105 S.E.2d 886 (1958). If, however, the two statutes simply cannot be reconciled, the language of the more specific promulgation prevails. The general rule of statutory construction requires that a specific statute be given precedence over a general statute relating to the same subject matter where the two cannot be reconciled. Syl. pt. 1, UMWA by Trumka v. Kingdon, 174 W. Va. 330, 325 S.E.2d 120 (1984). Accord Tillis v. Wright, 217 W. Va. 722, 728, 619 S.E.2d 235, 241 (2005) ([S]pecific statutory language generally takes precedence over more general statutory provisions.); Bowers v. Wurzburg, 205 W. Va. 450, 462, 519 S.E.2d 148, 160 (1999) (Typically, when two statutes govern a particular scenario, one being specific and one being general, the specific provision prevails. (citations omitted)); Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. Caryl, 181 W. Va. 42, 45, 380 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1989) (The rules of statutory construction require that a specific statute will control over a general statute when an unreconcilable conflict arises between the terms of the statutes. (citations omitted)). Viewing the two statutes at issue herein, W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2 is plainly a more general statute explaining the Legislature's overall purpose in enacting the Prevailing Wage Act, while W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7) is clearly a more specific statute defining the term employee as it is used throughout the Prevailing Wage Act. As the more specific statute, W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7) necessarily prevails as the controlling statute in the case sub judice.
As we noted above, we have previously interpreted the language of W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2. We have not yet, however, had occasion to examine the meaning of W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7). This section, which defines the term employee, provides that, [t]he term 'employee' for the purposes of this article, shall not be construed to include[ (See footnote 18) ] such persons as are employed or hired by the public authority on a regular or temporary basis or engaged in making temporary or emergency repairs. W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7) (footnote added). We find this language to be plain and in need of no further construction. This section plainly states that, for purposes of the West Virginia Prevailing Wage Act, workers who a public authority employs or hires on a regular or temporary basis are not considered to be employees. Id. Further, this section also excludes from the definition of employee those public authority workers who are engaged in making temporary or emergency repairs. W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7).
While the language of this statute is plain, its application is a bit more problematic. This definitional section, W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7), refers to employees of a public authority, while the general purpose section, W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2, references workmen employed by a public authority. The Act does not, however, separately define the term workman. (See footnote 19) Having carefully reviewed the entire Act, it is apparent that the Legislature intended the definition of employee to also give meaning to the term workman. Aside from an isolated reference to the word employees in the context of defining construction industry (See footnote 20) and use of the word employee in the definition of that term, (See footnote 21) the words employee and employees are not used elsewhere in the Act. The terms workman (See footnote 22) and workmen (See footnote 23) are repeatedly referenced throughout the Act, but they are not defined therein. Thus, it is clear that the Legislature intended the definition of employee to apply throughout the entire article setting forth the Prevailing Wage Act and to ascribe meaning to the word workman. See W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7) (providing definition of [t]he term 'employee' for the purposes of this article (emphasis added)). To construe the word employee otherwise would render it meaningless, and, in matters of statutory construction, every effort is made to give effect to each word and phrase adopted by the Legislature, (See footnote 24) the presumption being that the Legislature would not have committed a futile act. In other words, [i]t is always presumed that the legislature will not enact a meaningless or useless statute. Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Hardesty v. Aracoma-Chief Logan No. 4523, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Inc., 147 W. Va. 645, 129 S.E.2d 921 (1963). Accordingly, we hold that, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7) (1961) (Repl. Vol. 2002), the terms employee and workman, as used in the West Virginia Prevailing Wage Act, W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1, et seq., do not include workers who are (1) employed or hired by a public authority on a regular basis, (2) employed or hired by a public authority on a temporary basis, (3) employed or hired by a public authority to perform temporary repairs, or (4) employed or hired by a public authority to perform emergency repairs. (See footnote 25)
Applying W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7)'s definition of employee/workman to the policy declared in W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2 requires further statutory construction in order to give meaning to the legislative intent evidenced therein. As it is currently written, and as it was interpreted in ACT Foundation, W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2 requires the prevailing wage to be paid to all workmen employed by or on behalf of any public authority when such workers are engaged in the construction of public improvements. W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2 (emphasis added). However, the definition of employee/workman specifically excludes from its scope those workers employed or hired by a public authority. W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7). It is not possible, then, to require that the prevailing wage be paid to persons employed by a public authority because the more specific definitional section has specifically excluded such workers from the definition of employee. Thus, the only construction that will give meaning and effect to both the definitional section and the policy declaration section necessarily requires us to limit the scope and application of the purpose of the prevailing wage requirement. Any other construction would create an absurd result, which we are bound to avoid. See Syl. pt. 2, Richards v. Harman, 217 W. Va. 206, 617 S.E.2d 556 (2005) ('Where a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction, which will not produce such absurdity, will be made.' Syllabus Point 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W. Va. 774, 200 S.E. 350 (1938).); Syl. pt. 2, Conseco Fin. Serv'g Corp. v. Myers, 211 W. Va. 631, 567 S.E.2d 641 (2002) ('It is the duty of a court to construe a statute according to its true intent, and give to it such construction as will uphold the law and further justice. It is as well the duty of a court to disregard a construction, though apparently warranted by the literal sense of the words in a statute, when such construction would lead to injustice and absurdity.' Syllabus Point 2, Click v. Click, 98 W. Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925). (emphasis added)). Therefore, we hold that W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2 (1961) (Repl. Vol. 2002) requires the prevailing wage to be paid to all workmen who are employed on behalf of any public authority and who are engaged in the construction of public improvements. To the extent that our prior holding in Syllabus point 3 of Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation v. University of West Virginia Board of Trustees, 210 W. Va. 456, 557 S.E.2d 863 (2001), is inconsistent with this holding, it is expressly modified.
Having ascertained the proper meaning and application of the governing statutory law, we must now apply these statutes to the facts of the case sub judice. During the proceedings below, the hearing examiner determined that the TCSWA was required to pay the temporary workers at issue herein the prevailing wage for the work they had performed on the TCSWA's landfill expansion project. Because we disagree with the construction ascribed to the Act by the hearing examiner, we reach a contrary conclusion. As we noted above, W. Va. Code § 21-5A-1(7) does not include within the definition of employees or workmen to whom the Act applies those persons employed or hired by the public authority on a . . . temporary basis. Neither does W. Va. Code § 21-5A-2 require that the prevailing wage be paid to persons employed by a public authority. Therefore, it is apparent that the TCSWA was not required to pay the prevailing wage to the temporary workers it hired to perform excavation work on its landfill expansion project. Accordingly, we grant the writ of prohibition requested by the TCSWA.
Responding to the TCSWA's arguments on this point, both the DOL and the Trades Council (See footnote 32) suggest, and raise for the first time in the course of this case, that although the TCSWA did not let to contract the work involved herein, it was required to do so by the West Virginia Fairness In Competitive Bidding Act (hereinafter Competitive Bidding Act), W. Va. Code § 5-22-1, et seq., which details the criteria for determining whether projects are required to be let to contract. (See footnote 33) Therefore, they argue, that because the TCSWA violated the Competitive Bidding Act by not letting to contract the excavation work performed by the temporary workers, it should not be allowed to escape its responsibilities under the Prevailing Wage Act, which would have applied but for the TCSWA's violation of the Competitive Bidding Act.
We note at the outset that we have definitively determined, in the preceding section of this opinion, that the Prevailing Wage Act does not apply to the facts of this case and that the TCSWA is not required to pay the prevailing wage to temporary workers it hired to perform excavation work on its landfill expansion project. Thus, further consideration of the let to contract issue is not necessary for our decision of this case. We agree, however, that in order to determine the let to contract issue, it is also necessary to consider the requirements of the Competitive Bidding Act and whether the TCSWA complied with its provisions in hiring the aforementioned workers. Nevertheless, several factors preclude us from conducting such an inquiry in this case's present procedural posture.
First, the intimation that the TCSWA has violated the Competitive Bidding Act by not letting to contract the excavation work done on its landfill expansion project was not raised before or addressed by the hearing examiner. While we recognize that the instant matter is an original jurisdiction proceeding before this Court, we nevertheless must have a record upon which to base our decision of issues raised in this case. Insofar as the record in this case essentially consists of the record made before the DOL's hearing examiner, it is silent as to the parties' arguments on the Competitive Bidding issue and lacks the factual evidence necessary for us to determine this issue.
Moreover, because the question of the TCSWA's alleged violation of the Competitive Bidding Act is being raised for the first time before this tribunal, no administrative proceedings have been had on this matter. In this regard, the DOL represents that it is not responsible for enforcing the Competitive Bidding Act and that the entity that is charged with such enforcement is the Department of Administration; (See footnote 34) thus, the DOL's hearing examiner did not have jurisdiction to consider this issue. However, there is no indication that the Department of Administration has been notified of the allegations made regarding the TCSWA's actions regarding its landfill expansion project or that the Department of Administration has investigated the DOL's allegations, attempted to enforce the provisions of the Competitive Bidding Act against the TCSWA, or otherwise pursued this matter. Without having first litigated this matter through the appropriate administrative channels, consideration thereof by this Court is premature.
Finally, while the hearing examiner alluded to the Competitive Bidding Act in his decision in this case, such references were made with respect to the Attorney General's advisory opinion upon which he relied in interpreting the scope of the Prevailing Wage Act and comparisons between the wording and operation of the two acts. No mention was made of the possibility that the TCSWA might have violated the Competitive Bidding Act and, in fact, such allegations were first raised in DOL's Response Brief and the subsequent Intervenor and Amicus Briefs filed with this Court in the instant proceeding. All of these pleadings were filed after the TCSWA had filed its initial Petition for Writ of Prohibition and, in light of the nature of this proceeding, the TCSWA was precluded from filing a Reply Brief to respond to these allegations and arguments. (See footnote 35) Therefore, the only opportunity that the TCSWA had to address the competitive bidding issues raised by its opponents was during its oral argument before this Court. It was not permitted to reply in writing, and it did not have an opportunity to provide additional evidentiary documentation in support of its position. Thus, because the TCSWA has not had a full and fair opportunity to thoroughly address this issue, further consideration of it at this time is premature and raises concerns regarding the process that is due the TCSWA. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Jordan v. Roberts, 161 W. Va. 750, 246 S.E.2d 259 (1978) (Under procedural due process concepts a hearing must be appropriate to the nature of the case and from this flows the principle that the State cannot preclude the right to litigate an issue central to a statutory violation or deprivation of a property interest.); Syl. pt. 1, Sisler v. Hawkins, 158 W. Va. 1034, 217 S.E.2d 60 (1975) ('The due process of law guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions, when applied to procedure in the courts of the land, requires both notice and the right to be heard.' Point 2, Syllabus, Simpson v. Stanton, 119 W. Va. 235[, 193 S.E. 64 (1937)].).
In closing, we wish to make it abundantly clear that we do not condone the evasion of the requirements of one statute by the violation of a coordinating statute. Whether such shenanigans happened in this case remains to be seen and cannot be determined upon the record presently before us. Be that as it may, we decline further consideration of the let to contract issue having already determined that the TCSWA was not required to pay its temporary employees the prevailing wage for the work they performed on the TCSWA's landfill expansion project.