IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2008 Term
GARY ALLEN GIBSON,
Petitioner Below, Appellee
THOMAS McBRIDE, WARDEN,
MOUNT OLIVE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
Respondent Below, Appellant
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cabell County
The Honorable David M. Pancake, Judge
Case No. 93-C-2290
Submitted: January 9, 2008
Filed: June 12, 2008
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.
R. Lee Booten, II
Huntington, West Virginia
Robert D. Goldberg Counsel for the Appellee
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Counsel for the Appellant
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
JUSTICE BENJAMIN dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court
in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review the final
order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying
factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de
review. Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines
, 219 W.Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006).
2. 'The right to a trial by an impartial, objective jury in a criminal case is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution. Syllabus point
4, [in part,] State v. Peacher
, 167 W.Va. 540, 280 S.E.2d 559 (1981).' Syllabus point 4, in
part, State v. Derr
, 192 W.Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994). Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Varner
W.Va. 532, 575 S.E.2d 142 (2002).
This is an appeal by Thomas McBride, Warden, Mount Olive Correctional
Facility (Appellant), from an order entered in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, West
Virginia, on May 10, 2006. In that order, the circuit court set aside the conviction and
sentence of Gary Allen Gibson (Defendant) for conspiracy to commit murder. Upon
careful review of the briefs, record, arguments of counsel, and applicable precedent, this
Court is of the opinion that Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was violated when
the trial court allowed key witnesses for the State, who were incarcerated at the time of trial,
to testify in civilian clothing and without shackles while key defense witnesses _ who were
also incarcerated _ testified wearing prison attire and were forced to wear shackles.
Accordingly, the order granting Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In 1985, Defendant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment after he was
tried and convicted under the recidivist statute. (See footnote 1) See
W.Va. Code § 61-11-18 (2000) (Repl.
Vol. 2005). It was during his confinement in the West Virginia Penitentiary, in
Moundsville, West Virginia, that the State of West Virginia (State) indicted Defendant on
the felony charge of conspiracy. The indictment charged that on or about November 26,
1986, Defendant conspired with four other named inmates to commit the murder of Danny
Lehman, a fellow prisoner.
During the trial on the conspiracy charge, Defendant's version of the events
leading up to and including Danny Lehman's death was presented through the testimony of
several fellow inmates. Specifically, Defendant called seven witnesses who were
incarcerated at Moundsville at the time of trial. All seven witnesses were shackled and wore
prison attire while they testified. (See footnote 2)
According to the record in this case, over Defendant's objection, the trial court
ordered Defendant's incarcerated witnesses to remain bound and shackled during their
testimony for unspecified security reasons:
Prior to the presentation of evidence and testimony by
the Defense, the Court ordered that witnesses for the defendant,
those who were inmates transported from the Penitentiary at
Moundsville, would remain bound and shackled for security
reasons, to which ruling the defendant, by counsel, objects and
Although the foregoing April 17, 1989, order did not also indicate that the trial
court had ordered defense witnesses to appear in prison clothing, it is undisputed that all of
the defense witnesses who were incarcerated at Moundsville at the time of trial testified
wearing prison attire.
At trial, Defendant argued that he was not part of a conspiracy to murder
Danny Lehman. Inmate Gary Gillespie testified that he acted alone when he stabbed
Lehman in self defense. Gillespie testified that there was a history of trouble between him
and Lehman and that, on the day of the murder, the two were involved in a verbal altercation
over a piece of exercise equipment in the prison recreation yard. (See footnote 3) According to Gillespie,
Lehman told him he was going to go arm himself and when he returned, Gillespie should be
armed, too. Gillespie testified that when Lehman returned,
I noticed _ I can't remember _ quite remember if it was
the left or his right hand, was hidden out of view behind his leg,
and in my mind when I seen that I assumed that he might have
had a weapon there out of my sight, but as far as seeing him
with a weapon, no, I didn't.
. . .
I was just moving along slowly and he was moving at me
slowly and it happened so quick. It was more or less a clash.
He fell into me and it was just maybe a five or six second thing.
. . . we're clutching each other, and I reached down with my left
hand and pull out my knife and I strike out.
. . .
Well, I had overpowered him with my right arm I had
around his neck, and I just brought it around in an arc with my
left hand, my knife, and struck and he fell, he collapsed[.]
Gillespie testified that he acted alone in killing Lehman and did not enlist the
help of Defendant or any of the other named co-conspirators. (See footnote 4)
Following Gillespie's testimony, Defendant called six witnesses who were
being housed at Moundsville at the time of trial. The purpose of the testimony of five of
these witnesses was to directly contradict the State's theory that, as a co-conspirator,
Defendant was standing with the other co-conspirators when and where the murder occurred
in order to help facilitate the commission of the murder. Four of these witnesses testified
that, after having just come in from recreation, they were talking to Defendant in a different
part of the penitentiary when Lehman was murdered. (See footnote 5)
Inmate David Morgan testified that
although he was standing near to where the murder occurred, Defendant was not. Morgan
also testified that neither he nor any of the other indicted co-conspirators, including
Defendant, participated in the murder of Danny Lehman. (See footnote 6)
The foregoing witnesses' testimony corroborated Defendant's own testimony
that he did not conspire to murder Lehman and did not know Lehman was going to be
killed. (See footnote 7)
According to Defendant, he was not present when Lehman was stabbed but was in
another location of the prison talking to some other inmates. He testified that when all of
a sudden it got real noisy and there was a lot of movement, he started walking toward the
direction of his cell and eventually saw Lehman's dead body lying on the ground.
Contrary to Defendant's version of events, the manner in which Lehman was
murdered, who was involved in carrying out the murder, and the identity of the person who
committed the murder itself were depicted much differently by the State. Two of the State's
key witnesses, Ervil Bogard and Wallace Jackson, were Defendant's fellow inmates at
Moundsville when the murder occurred; however, sometime prior to trial, they were
transferred to different facilities in exchange for their testimony in this case. (See footnote 8)
of these witnesses was critical to proving the State's case. Unlike their former prison mates,
Bogard and Jackson were permitted to wear civilian clothing at trial. In an order entered on
January 4, 1989, the trial court directed the Department of Corrections to furnish these
witnesses each with one noninstitutional shirt and pair of pants for trial. (See footnote 9)
they were not forced to wear shackles during their testimony before the jury.
Inmate Wallace Jackson testified that on the evening of the murder, Defendant,
Gillespie and three other inmates stopped outside his cell door. According to Jackson,
Gillespie handed him a knife through the door and told him to put it under his pillow.
Jackson testified that while Defendant and the other three men were still standing outside
Jackson's cell, several of them talked about getting ready to kill Lehman and told the men
who had gathered, including Defendant, where to stand. According to Jackson, when
Defendant and David Morgan were directed to stand outside Jackson's cell door to the left,
both men, who were already standing to the left of the door, complied and stayed on the
left-hand side of the door. Jackson also testified that he saw Defendant carrying a knife.
Finally, Jackson testified that when he saw Lehman come down the tier,
Gillespie grabbed him from behind and pulled Lehman towards him. Jackson stated that he
saw John Perry and Paul Brumfield stab Lehman. He testified that, meanwhile, he saw
Defendant standing less than fifteen feet away. (See footnote 10)
A second key prosecution witness, inmate Ervil Bogard, testified that the day
before the murder, he was approached by all of the inmates who were indicted in the
conspiracy to murder Lehman, including Defendant. According to Bogard, several of these
men told him they were going to kill Lehman and asked Bogard to be a cut off person, to
make sure nobody else from the Avenger's [Lehman's gang] jumped in to help [Lehman]
when it came down. Bogard further testified that Defendant and two others, Gillespie and
Brumfield, asked Bogard if he was going to join their group, the Aryan Brotherhood. Bogard
testified that he understood this question as an inquiry into whether he would help them
murder Lehman. (See footnote 11)
Bogard testified that, on the evening of the murder, he watched from his cell
as Lehman was lured to the area where Defendant and the other indicted co-conspirators
were standing and that one of the men, Gillespie, grabbed Lehman from behind while Perry
made a stabbing motion towards Lehman's eye.
On January 19, 1989, at the conclusion of the three-day trial before a jury in
the Circuit Court of Cabell County, (See footnote 12) Defendant was convicted of the conspiracy charge. (See footnote 13)
On January 21, 2000, June 23, 2000, and May 30, 2001, (See footnote 14) Defendant, by
counsel, filed amended petitions for post-conviction habeas corpus relief. (See footnote 15) An omnibus
habeas corpus hearing was conducted in the Circuit Court of Cabell County on June 7, 2001,
before the Honorable David M. Pancake, Judge.
Defendant asserted ten grounds for relief in connection with his habeas
petition. The habeas court deemed three of them to be meritorious. The court found that the
trial court erred in allowing the State's incarcerated witnesses to testify at trial in civilian
attire and without shackles while ordering the Defendant's incarcerated witnesses to appear
wearing both prison clothing and shackles; (See footnote 16) in admitting a post-mortem photograph of the
murder victim because it was not relevant and had no probative value; and in denying
Defendant's motion for a continuance after the State disclosed the trial transcripts of a co-
conspirator four days before trial.
In granting the Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, the court
concluded that although the foregoing errors, individually, were not sufficient to award
Defendant the requested relief, the combination of the three errors constitute cumulative
error on a scale that denied [Defendant] his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial.
In this appeal from the May 10, 2006 Opinion Order Granting Writ of Habeas
Corpus, we find that in allowing the State's key witnesses to testify in civilian attire and
without shackles while key witnesses for the Defendant testified in prison clothing and were
ordered to be bound and shackled at trial, the trial court violated the Defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial. Therefore, we affirm the granting of the writ. (See footnote 17)
II. Standard of Review
Our consideration of this appeal is guided by the following standard of review:
In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions
of the circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a
three-prong standard of review. We review the final order and
the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard;
the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard; and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.
Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006).
The crime for which Defendant was tried and convicted occurred while he was
an inmate in the State Penitentiary at Moundsville. The State and Defendant presented
different theories regarding how inmate Danny Lehman was murdered, who murdered him,
and whether Defendant was involved in a conspiracy to commit the murder. Not
surprisingly, the most crucial evidence on these issues consisted almost exclusively of the
testimony of witnesses who were inmates at Moundsville when the murder occurred.
Defendant called seven witnesses who were incarcerated at Moundsville at the time of trial;
all seven were shackled (See footnote 18)
and wore prison garb (See footnote 19)
while they testified. The State called two
inmates as witnesses; these key witnesses testified wearing civilian clothing and were not
forced to wear shackles in front of the jury.
In West Virginia [a] criminal defendant has no constitutional right to have his
witnesses appear at trial without physical restraints or in civilian attire. Syl. Pt. 3, State ex
rel. McMannis v. Mohn, 163 W.Va. 129, 254 S.E.2d 805 (1979), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831
(1983). Though this general principle of law remains sound, it is not absolute. In McMannis, we recognized that there may be occasions when forcing the defendant's
witnesses to testify in physical restraints [or prison attire] may create sufficient prejudice that
reversible error will occur. 163 W.Va. at 140, 254 S.E.2d at 811. See State v. Allah Jamaal
W., 209 W.Va.1, 4, 543 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2000). We find that under the unique facts
presented, there was sufficient prejudice to Defendant's case which resulted in a violation
of his constitutional right to a fair trial and, therefore, constituted reversible error.
The critical evidence regarding whether Defendant was a co-conspirator in the
murder of Danny Lehman was provided by a procession of incarcerated witnesses who
testified on behalf of both Defendant and the State. Thus, this case was largely a credibility
battle, and the jury's verdict hinged on whose version of events the jury chose to believe. See State v. Knott, 708 A.2d 288, 295 (Md. 1998). Accordingly, this Court cannot understate
the impact on the jury of the glaring disparity in the witnesses' physical appearance. Indeed,
in Allah Jamaal W., we acknowledged that,
[t]he prejudice to a defendant from requiring one of his
witnesses to testify in handcuffs lies in the inherent
psychological impact on the jury, not merely in the fact that the
jury may suspect that the witness committed a crime. . . . [T]he
jury is necessarily prejudiced against someone appearing in
restraints as being in the opinion of the judge a dangerous man,
and one not to be trusted, even under the surveillance of
209 W.Va. at 7-8, 543 S.E.2d at 288-89 (quoting State v. Williams, 629 P.2d 54, 57-58
(Alaska 1981)). (See footnote 20) Likewise, in McMannis, we recognized that '[i]n the minds of the jurors
the credibility of [incarcerated witnesses required to testify in prison attire] can be affected
in the same manner as the [defendant's] presumption of innocence can be diminished by the
defendant's appearance in prison garb.' 163 W.Va. at 135-36, 254 S.E.2d at 809 (quoting
State v. Yates, 381 A.2d 536, 537 (Conn. 1977)). Other courts have also recognized the risk
of unfair prejudice to a defendant whose witnesses are forced to testify in prison garb or
restraints. See Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1982) (Although the shackling
of defense witnesses may be less prejudicial to the accused because it does not directly affect
the presumption of innocence, it nevertheless may harm his defense by detracting from his
witness' credibility.); Commonwealth v. Brown, 305 N.E.2d 830, 834 (Mass. 1974) (The
shackling of a witness. . . may influence a jury's judgment of credibility and further hurt the
defendant in so far as the witness is conceived to be associated with him.); Hightower v.
State, 154 P.3d 639, 641 (Nev. 2007) ([R]equiring an incarcerated defense witness to
appear in prison clothing may prejudice the accused by undermining the witness's credibility
in an impermissible manner.); State v. Hartzog, 635 P.2d 694, 703 (Wash. 1981) (While
a shackled witness may not directly affect the [defendant's] presumption of innocence, it
seems plain that there may be some inherent prejudice to defendant, as the jury may doubt
the witness' credibility.).
Under the unique facts of this case, where seven crucial defense witnesses
testified before the jury in prison garb and shackles while the State's two key witnesses
testified in civilian clothing and without shackles, it would be illogical to conclude that the
witnesses' contrasting appearance did not appreciably impact the jury's assessment of the
witnesses' credibility. As this Court pointed out in Allah Jamaal W., [r]egardless of how
credible the testimony of these witnesses may have been, . . . it [is] unlikely that the jury
would find their testimony credible. 209 W.Va. at 7, 543 S.E.2d at 288. As we held in
syllabus point two of State v. Varner, 212 W.Va. 532, 575 S.E.2d 142 (2002), '[t]he right
to a trial by an impartial, objective jury in a criminal case is a fundamental right guaranteed
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article III,
Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution. Syllabus point 4, [in part,] State v. Peacher,
167 W.Va. 540, 280 S.E.2d 559 (1981).' Syllabus point 4, in part, State v. Derr, 192 W.Va.
165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994). And the question of whether a jury is impartial is dependent
upon whether the jurors are free from bias or prejudice either for or against the accused. State v. McClure, 184 W.Va. 418, 421, 400 S.E.2d 853, 856 (1990) (citing State v. Pratt, 161
W.Va. 530, 244 S.E.2d 227 (1978), and State v. Hatfield, 48 W.Va. 561, 37 S.E. 626
(1900)). Accordingly, the drastic contrast in the physical appearance of the parties'
incarcerated witnesses _ each of whom provided crucial testimony at trial _ unfairly
influenced the jury's judgment of the witnesses' credibility. As a result, Defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial was clearly violated. Accordingly, we affirm the lower
court's order granting Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. (See footnote 21)
For the reasons stated above, the order entered May 10, 2006, is hereby
Defendant had been previously convicted of voluntary manslaughter in 1978
and, in 1982, he pled guilty to the offense of burglary. Following his conviction of a
separate burglary offense in 1985, he was tried and convicted as a recidivist.
An eighth witness, John Tompkins, who was housed at Moundsville when the
crime occurred, was incarcerated at the Huttonsville Correctional Facility at the time of trial.
During his trial testimony, Mr. Tompkins wore civilian attire and was not forced to wear
Danny Lehman was the leader of the Avengers, a motorcycle club comprised
of a group of inmates. Lehman recruited other inmates to become members, including
Gillespie. Gillespie testified that he was kicked out of the group after he broke one of its
rules by having friends outside of the Avengers. Gillespie testified that he then joined an
organization known as the Aryan Brotherhood.
We note that, during the habeas hearing and in this appeal, Defendant's
counsel indicated that, in fact, there was a conspiracy to murder Lehman but that Defendant
was not a part of it.
These witnesses were William Wayne, Tony Kile, Robert Shepherd and
We note that Morgan pled guilty to the conspiracy charge in an Alford plea. See Coleman v. Painter
, 215 W.Va. 592, 597 n.8, 600 S.E.2d 304, 309 n.8 (2003) (In an
'Alford plea,' a criminal defendant pleads guilty while proclaiming his innocence.)
At trial, Defendant wore civilian clothing and was not shackled. As we held
in syllabus point 2 of State v. Finley
, 219 W.Va. 747, 639 S.E.2d 839 (2006), '[a] criminal
defendant has the right under the Due Process Clause of our State and Federal Constitutions
not to be forced to trial in identifiable prison attire.' Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State ex rel.
McMannis v. Mohn
, 163 W.Va. 129, 254 S.E.2d 805 (1979). Moreover, [a] criminal
defendant has the right, absent some necessity relating to courtroom security or order, to be
tried free of physical restraints. Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Brewster
, 164 W.Va. 173, 261 S.E.2d 77
Prior to trial, the State filed a Notice of Consideration Given to State
Witnesses, which stated that Wallace Jackson agreed to provide truthful testimony in
exchange for transfer to another correctional institution. The notice also indicated that Ervil
Bogard agreed to provide truthful testimony in exchange for dismissal by the State of a
pending felony charge, and for a motion by the State to expunge Bogard's record of all
unlitigated charges arising out of the January riots that occurred at Moundsville. The
notice also indicated that Bogard's truthful testimony was to be given in exchange for
transfer to the Huttonsville Correctional Facility and recommendation by the State that he
be granted probation when eligible.
The January 4, 1989, pre-trial order also directed the Department of
Corrections to transport Bogard and Jackson to the trial location on certain named dates and
to provide sufficient personnel to guard against their escape. This order was prepared by the
special prosecuting attorney who tried the case on behalf of the State. The record does not
indicate if the order was entered pursuant to a formal motion by the State or, if such a motion
was made, if Defendant's counsel objected to it.
Contrary to Jackson's testimony, defense witness Doug Swisher testified that
while he and Jackson were both inmates at Huttonsville, Jackson admitted to Swisher that
Defendant was not involved in Lehman's murder that he knew of. According to Swisher,
Jackson told him that he was planning to testify against Defendant because Jackson and
Defendant had had words before and [Defendant] wanted to jump on him and that he was
trying to get _ cutting his time break, you know, his time that he was sentenced for. We
note that, at the time of trial, Swisher was on parole. Consequently, he testified wearing
civilian clothing and was not physically restrained.
Bogard did not agree to help with Lehman's murder.
Though Defendant was indicted on the conspiracy charge in the Circuit Court
of Marshall County, the matter was transferred to the Circuit Court of Cabell County upon
a motion for change of venue.
Following Defendant's conspiracy conviction, a second recidivist information
was filed against him based upon the felonies set forth in the first recidivist information.
Defendant ultimately entered into a plea agreement under which he agreed to acknowledge
his three prior felony convictions and also waived the recidivist trial, as provided for in
W.Va. Code § 61-11-19 (1943) (Repl. Vol. 2005). He was given a second life recidivist
sentence, which was ordered to run consecutively to the first. Defendant later challenged
the second life recidivist sentence in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which he filed with
this Court on or about July 3, 1991. Defendant's request for habeas relief was denied in Gibson v. Legursky
, 187 W.Va. 51, 415 S.E.2d 457 (1992). See Id.
, at syl. pt. 2 (holding that
'[d]ouble jeopardy principles are not offended merely because earlier convictions used to
establish a recidivist conviction are subsequently utilized to prove a second recidivist
On August 21, 2000, Defendant, by counsel, filed Checklist of Grounds
Asserted or Waived in Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceeding, pursuant to the West
Virginia Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act, W.Va. Code §§ 53-4A-1 to -11 (Repl. Vol.
2000), and Losh v. McKenzie
, 166 W.Va. 762, 277 SE.2d 606 (1981).
Defendant, pro se
, twice filed post-conviction writs of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum in the Circuit Court of Marshall County. That court dismissed both petitions
on the ground that Marshall County was not a convenient forum. By order entered
October 7, 1993, the court directed Defendant to seek relief in the Circuit Court of Cabell
County, the court in which he was tried and convicted. Present counsel was appointed to
represent Defendant in the habeas corpus proceeding by order entered in Cabell County
Circuit Court on November 16, 1993.
Despite this ruling by the habeas court, as previously noted, the trial court's
April 17, 1989, post-trial order addressed only the use of shackles on the Defendant's
witnesses. The order indicated that the defense witnesses transported from Moundsville
were to remain bound and shackled; this order did not also require these witnesses to testify
wearing prison attire. It is undisputed, however, that the witnesses wore prison garb during
Because we affirm the granting of the writ on the issue of prison garb and
shackles, we need not address the remaining issues of whether the trial court committed error
in denying Defendant's motion to continue and in admitting a post-mortem photograph of
As previously noted, defense counsel objected to the shackling of the defense
witnesses. In State ex rel. McMannis v. Mohn, 163 W.Va. 129, 139 n.7, 254 S.E.2d 805, 810
n.7 (1979), we outlined numerous factors which have been considered in determining
whether physical restraints should be placed on a testifying witness:
(1) [T]he seriousness of the present charge, (2) the
person's character, (3) the person's past record, (4) past escapes
by the person, (5) attempted escapes by the person, (6) evidence
the person is planning an escape, (7) threats of harm to others,
(8) threats to cause disturbance, (9) evidence the person is bent
upon self-destruction, (10) risk of mob violence, (11) risk of
attempted revenge by victim's family, (12) other offenders still
at large, . . . [Citations omitted]
A.B.A. Advisory committee on the Criminal Trial, Standards Relating to Trial
at 96 n.9 (Approved Draft 1968)). See State v. Allah Jamaal W.
, 209 W.Va. 1, 543
S.E.2d 282 (2000), which significantly post-dates Defendant's criminal trial, but in which
this Court provides further guidance regarding whether an incarcerated witness should be
required to wear prison attire and/or shackles while testifying, including, inter alia
burdens and responsibilities of both defense counsel and the trial court in such cases.
Finally, we note that, as a general principle, it is within the sound discretion
of a trial court to determine whether a defense witness should be required to testify wearing
prison attire and/or shackles. See Syl. Pt. 3, Allah Jamaal W. However, in order for this
Court to determine if a trial court abused its discretion, there must be some clear indication
in the record which sufficiently justifies the court's decision. In the instant matter, the trial
court required every witness being transported from Moundsville to remain bound and
shackled. The trial court's April 17, 1989, order also stated, without more, that all of these
witnesses were shackled for unidentified security reasons. Although the trial court may
have had sufficient reasons for ordering the witnesses shackled, we find the stated basis for
its ruling to be woefully inadequate. Rather, for appellate review purposes, the trial court
should have articulated reasons for the shackling which were specific to each individual
witness. See n. 18, supra. See also Allah Jamaal W., 209 W.Va. at 7, 543 S.E.2d at 288.
(After defense counsel made a timely motion to permit incarcerated defense witnesses to
testify in civilian attire and without shackles, the trial court denied the motion without
provid[ing] any relevant reason for the denial. Because the record was silent as to the trial
court's decision to deny the motion, we concluded that such denial was an abuse of