Davis, J., concurring:
In this proceeding, the juvenile contended that he was denied the right to allocution during the dispositional phase of his prosecution. The majority opinion agreed with the juvenile, reversed the dispositional order of the trial court, and remanded the case for a new dispositional hearing to permit the juvenile to exercise his right to allocution. I fully concur in the resolution of this issue. I have chosen to write separately to clarify another issue that will be addressed on remand; the use of a multidisciplinary team in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Treatment teams shall assess, plan and implement a comprehensive,
individualized service plan . . . for juveniles and their families involved
in . . . delinquency proceedings when . . . the court is considering placing the
juvenile in the department's custody or placing the juvenile out-of-home at the
department's expense pursuant to the provisions of section thirteen of said
article. In any such . . . delinquency case, the juvenile probation officer shall
notify the local office of the department of health and human resources and the
division of juvenile services at least five working days before the court
proceeding in order to allow the multidisciplinary treatment team to convene
and develop a comprehensive individualized service plan for the child.
Plainly then, under W. Va. Code § 49-5D-3(a)(2), the use of a multidisciplinary team is mandatory in a juvenile delinquency proceeding only when the court is considering (1) placing the juvenile in DHHR's custody, or (2) placing the juvenile out-of-home at DHHR's expense. Although we may question the wisdom of limiting the use of multidisciplinary teams to only these two situations, [o]ur job is not to weigh the wisdom of . . . a statute. West Virginia Health Care Cost Review Auth. v. Boone Mem'l Hosp., 196 W. Va. 326, 339, 472 S.E.2d 411, 424 (1996). Accord State ex rel. City of Charleston v. Bosely, 165 W. Va. 332, 352 n.3, 268 S.E.2d 590, 601 n.3 (1980) (Neely, C.J., dissenting) (Courts cannot be concerned with legislative policy or the mere wisdom or lack of wisdom of the statute in question.). The Legislature has spoken in clear and unambiguous terms in limiting the use of multidisciplinary teams in delinquency proceedings. Consequently, the trial court's inquiry into this issue on remand must be guided by the statutory restrictions imposed on the use of multidisciplinary teams.
In view of the foregoing, I concur.