Filed: February 17, 1995
Howard J. Blyler
Cowen, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellee
Paul E. Jordan
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellant
JUSTICE CLECKLEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON did not participate.
JUDGE FOX sitting by temporary assignment.
1. "W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, provides for a mandatory
revocation of an operator's license upon receipt of a record of
conviction of a specified offense when that conviction has become
final. That section does not provide for an administrative hearing
either before or after the revocation, but, rather, for 'forthwith'
revocation." Syllabus Point 1, in part, Wells v. Roberts, 167
W.Va. 580, 280 S.E.2d 266 (1981).
2. "Mandatory administrative revocation of an operator's license, without an administrative hearing, under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, where there has been a prior hearing and conviction on the underlying criminal charge, does not deny the person whose license is so revoked due process of law." Syllabus Point 2, Wells v. Roberts, 167 W. Va. 580, 280 S.E.2d 266 (1981).
3. A prior criminal adjudication in another state
establishing driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs
satisfies the same function of the administrative hearing described
in W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2 (1986).
4. "The proper forum for attacking the constitutional
validity of a prior traffic offense conviction when that offense is
the foundation for adverse administrative action by the
commissioner of motor vehicles is the county in which such a
conviction was initially rendered if the conviction is a West Virginia conviction, or the state courts of the state in which the
conviction was initially rendered if it is an out-of-state
conviction." Syllabus, in part, Stalnaker v. Roberts, 168 W. Va.
593, 287 S.E.2d 166 (1982).
The respondent below and appellant, Jane L. Cline,
Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), appeals the
January 28, 1994, order of the Circuit Court of Braxton County
which concluded that the petitioner below and appellee herein,
Leonard Sniffin, was entitled to an administrative hearing because
his driver's license was being revoked for a second offense of
driving under the influence (DUI) under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5
(1986),See footnote 1 as the result of an out-of-state conviction.
Upon receiving notice of Mr. Sniffin's convictions for
DUI, the DMV revoked his driver's license for a period of ten
years. After the DMV refused Mr. Sniffin's request for a hearing,
Mr. Sniffin successfully petitioned the circuit court, which found
that he was entitled to an administrative hearing. By order dated January 28, 1994, the circuit court required the DMV to provide an
administrative hearing before the revocation became effective. The
DMV appeals the circuit court's order contending that W. Va. Code,
17B-3-5, does not require a hearing and that the circuit court
exceeded its authority. We agree with the DMV and find that W. Va.
Code, 17B-3-5, does not require a hearing. Therefore, we reverse
the circuit court.
On February 26, 1991, the DMV received documents relating to the Mr. Sniffin's August 2, 1989, arrest and September 14, 1989, conviction for DUI in the State of Virginia. These records indicated that Mr. Sniffin's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Virginia had been suspended for six months and he had been ordered to participate in an alcohol rehabilitation program. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Sniffin possessed a West Virginia driver's license and his car was registered in West Virginia.
In response to this information, by administrative order
dated March 4, 1991, the DMV revoked the driver's license of Mr.
Sniffin pursuant to W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, for six months and
thereafter until he had successfully completed a required safety
and treatment program and paid a $15.00 reinstatement fee. He was
eligible for reinstatement in ninety days upon completion of the
program and payment of the reinstatement fee.
Subsequently, the DMV received notice from Virginia that
the Mr. Sniffin again was arrested on January 6, 1990, and
convicted on April 10, 1990, for driving under the influence of
alcohol in the State of Virginia. Mr. Sniffin pleaded guilty to
this second offense. After receiving notice of this second
offense, the DMV ordered the revocation of Mr. Sniffin's driver's
license for ten years with eligibility for reinstatement in five
years upon successful completion of the safety and treatment
program and payment of the $15.00 reinstatement fee. The DMV
issued this second order on June 13, 1991.
On October 15, 1991, Mr. Sniffin wrote the DMV and
requested a hearing on the June 13, 1991, revocation. He was
informed that because his convictions occurred outside West
Virginia, pursuant to W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, he was not entitled to
an administrative hearing on the revocation. Mr. Sniffin was later
arrested for driving on a revoked driver's license.
On June 18, 1992, Mr. Sniffin brought an action in the
Circuit Court of Braxton County alleging that he was entitled to an
administrative hearing on his out-of-state offenses pursuant to
W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6 (1989).See footnote 2 After conducting a hearing on
January 28, 1994, the circuit court found that Mr. Sniffin was
entitled to an administrative hearing on his second revocation and ordered the DMV to provide such a hearing. The DMV now appeals the
circuit court's order.
The DMV asserts that under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5(6),See footnote 3 a
driver's license must be revoked "forthwith" upon receiving notice
of a final out-of-state DUI conviction provided the offense
contains the same elements as W. Va. Code, 17C-5-2 (1986).See footnote 4 The
DMV further argues the revocation is mandatory and the statute does
not provide for an administrative hearing. On the other hand, Mr.
Sniffin contends a hearing is required pursuant to W. Va. Code,
17B-3-6, and W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-1, et seq.,See footnote 5 if requested, before
his license can be revoked.
The primary issue in this appeal, as formulated by the
parties, is whether Mr. Sniffin is entitled to an administrative hearing prior to the revocation of his driver's license.See footnote 6 In
deciding whether the DMV's position should be sustained, we apply
the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We first ask whether
the Legislature has "directly spoken to the precise [legal]
question at issue." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781,
81 L.Ed.2d at 702-03. "If the intention of the Legislature is
clear, that is the end of the matter." Id. If it is not, we may
not simply impose our own construction of the statute. "Rather, if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the [DMV's] answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d at 703. See Pauley v.
Bethenergy Mines Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696-98, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 2534,
115 L.Ed.2d 604, 623-25 (1991). In the present case, it is clear
that the Legislature has not spoken to the precise question at issue. Therefore, we review the DMV's decision to determine
whether its construction is one the Legislature would have
sanctioned. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383, 81
S.Ct. 1554, 1560-61, 6 L.Ed.2d 908, 915 (1961).
The DMV revoked Mr. Sniffin's license pursuant to W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, which provides for the mandatory revocation of a driver's license under certain circumstances.See footnote 7 Because this section of the statute does not provide for an administrative hearing prior to revocation, we agree with the DMV and hold that neither W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, nor W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, grants a hearing under the circumstances of this case.
The circuit court's adjudicatory interpretation of these
statutes is entitled to no special deference and is subject to our
independent review. Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., ___ W. Va. ___, ___
S.E.2d ___ (No. 22037 12/8/94). See also Zapata Haynie Corp. v.
Barnard, 933 F.2d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 1991). However, absent clear
legislative intent to the contrary, we afford deference to a
reasonable and permissible construction of the statute by the DMV
because it has policymaking authority with regard to the statute.See footnote 8
Here, the DMV's construction, as reflected in its brief
submitted in this case, is reasonable, supported by the law, not
contrary to legislative intent, and is consistent with this Court's
prior decisions. We further find that the DMV's answer is a
reasonable accommodation of potentially conflicting policies that
were committed to the DMV by the statute. Because we find DMV's
construction is one the Legislature would have sanctioned, we defer
to that interpretation and, accordingly reverse the circuit court.
In Wells v. Roberts, 167 W. Va. 580, 280 S.E.2d 266
(1981), this Court determined that W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, and W. Va.
Code, 17B-3-6, were two separate sections that did not control each
other. In Syllabus Point 1, in part, of Wells, we stated:
"W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, provides for a mandatory revocation of an operator's license upon receipt of a record of conviction of a specified offense when that conviction has become final. That section does not provide for an administrative hearing either before or after the revocation, but, rather, for 'forthwith' revocation."
In recognizing the differences between these two Code sections,
this Court noted that W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, covers discretionary
revocations when there has "not been a prior judicial determination
that the licensee is guilty of a vehicular offense that would
justify a finding that he is a present danger to the public using
the roads". 167 W. Va. at 584, 280 S.E.2d at 269. On the other
hand, W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, provides for revocations "only after
there has been a judicial determination of guilt as evidenced by a
record of conviction". 167 W. Va. at 584, 280 S.E.2d at 269.
Additionally, we stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Wells, supra:
"Mandatory administrative revocation of an operator's license, without an administrative hearing, under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, where there has been a prior hearing and conviction on the underlying criminal charge, does not deny the person whose license is so revoked due process of law."
Considering the significant differences between W. Va.
Code, 17B-3-5, and W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, and our holding in Wells
v. Roberts, supra, we expressly find that W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6,
does not create a right to an administrative hearing under W. Va.
Code, 17B-3-5. Thus, the circuit court was in error when it
granted Mr. Sniffin an administrative hearing based on W. Va. Code,
Alternatively, Mr. Sniffin argues that W. Va. Code, 17C- 5A-1 and -2, support the circuit court's order requiring an administrative hearing prior to the revocation of his driver's license. This contention collapses in the wake of precedent and reasonable statutory construction. Generally, these statutory provisions provide only the administrative process and procedures for suspending and revoking a driver's license for DUI.
Although portions of W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-1 and -2, are
relevant to our construction of W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, they do not
create a right of hearing for an individual whose license is
revoked pursuant to W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5. As argued by Mr.
Sniffin, W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2(d), gives a right to a hearing if
requested before a license suspension becomes final, but the scope
and purpose of this hearing are limited to:
"whether the person did drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs, or did drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration in his blood of ten hundredths of one percent or more, by weight, or did refuse to submit to the designated secondary chemical test."See footnote 9
As we stated in Wells and reaffirm here, W. Va. Code,
17B-3-5, applies only to administrative revocations after a prior
judicial determination of whether a person drove under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. Unlike W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, where
there has not been a prior judicial determination, a hearing under W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2 is designed solely to establish whether a
person was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol before
revoking such person's driver's license. It is unclear what Mr.
Sniffin believes he would accomplish through an administrative
hearing considering the primary purpose of the hearing has already
been answered and satisfied through his DUI convictions in
Virginia. An administrative hearing in this State following a
conviction in another state would serve no purpose. To resolve any
future doubt, we now make explicit what the Legislature has
implicitly provided: A prior criminal adjudication in another
state establishing DUI satisfies the same function of the
administrative hearing described in W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2. See
Wells v. Roberts, supra (holding that a state can use a prior
criminal adjudication as the basis for an administrative
It is clear that the constitutional guarantee of due
process is satisfied by West Virginia's mandatory license
revocation procedures. A seminal case on due process rights in the
context of a driver's license revocation is Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). In Bell, the
Supreme Court held that a person could not be deprived of his
driver's license without being afforded a modicum of procedural due
process.See footnote 10 The Supreme Court of Arizona subsequently explained that "the purpose of the hearing mandated by Bell v. Burson . . . is to
allow a motorist an opportunity to demonstrate that he is free from
fault and, therefore, his license should not be revoked." State v.
Jennings, 150 Ariz. 90, 93, 722 P.2d 258, 261 (1986). In Jennings,
the Arizona Court rejected a due process challenge to a mandatory
driver's license revocation based on procedures similar to that
presented in the instant case. Holding that the purpose of a Bell
v. Burson hearing in such a case was satisfied by the statutory
procedure, the Arizona court emphasized: "Revocation, pursuant to
this section, occurs only after a conviction has become final for
one of the enumerated offenses. The driver has already had the
opportunity for a full trial before the mandatory provision of
A.R.S. § 28-445 applies."See footnote 11 150 Ariz. at 93, 722 P.2d at 261.
Once the major purpose of the administrative hearing is
satisfied, the only justification for having an additional hearing
would be to permit collateral attacks on the validity of the out-
of-state conviction. However, in the Syllabus, in part, of
Stalnaker v. Roberts, 168 W. Va. 593, 287 S.E.2d 166 (1982), we
established that collaterally attacking a conviction is an
impermissible objective of administrative actions:
"The proper forum for attacking the constitutional validity of a prior traffic offense conviction when that offense is the foundation for adverse administrative action by the commissioner of motor vehicles is the county in which such a conviction was initially rendered if the conviction is a West Virginia conviction, or the state courts of the state in which the conviction was initially rendered if it is an out-of-state conviction." (Citations omitted).See footnote 12
Finally, Mr. Sniffin points to the fact that W. Va. Code,
17B-3-5, does not provide a specific revocation period and that
Virginia treated both his DUI convictions as first offenses. The
relevance of this information is not discussed by the parties.
Presumably, Mr. Sniffin believes that this additional information
bolsters his argument that he is entitled to a hearing because
there is no definite period of revocation provided under W. Va.
Code, 17B-3-5, and West Virginia treated him differently than he
would have been treated in Virginia. This argument is also
unpersuasive. We believe it is irrelevant that W. Va. Code, 17B-3-
5 itself does not provide for a specific length of time for
revocation because this section must be read in concert with other
Article III of the Drivers' License Compact indicates
that the "licensing authority" of one state will report convictions
of the licensee to the "licensing authority" of the home state of
a licensee. W. Va. Code, 17B-1A-1 (1972).See footnote 13 Additionally, Article IV(a)(2) of W. Va. Code, 17B-1A-1 (1972), provides that the home
state will treat any conviction for driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs occurring in another state
as if it had occurred in the home state.See footnote 14 On two separate
occasions, the DMV revoked Mr. Sniffin's driver's license under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, after it received conclusive proof that Mr.
Sniffin had been convicted for DUI in a foreign state while holding
a West Virginia driver's license. As required by W. Va. Code, 17B-
1A-1, a licensee convicted for an out-of-state driving infraction
will be treated as if the incident occurred in West Virginia.
W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2(i), requires the DMV to revoke "the person's
license for a period of ten years" if that person's license
previously had been revoked.See footnote 15 Thus, the DMV appropriately revoked
Mr. Sniffin's license for ten years. The sentence or sanction
imposed upon Mr. Sniffin by Virginia is not controlling, and it is
equally irrelevant that Virginia treated both Mr. Sniffin's DUI
convictions as first offenses. If Mr. Sniffin had been driving
under the influence in West Virginia, he would have been convicted of a second offense and, ultimately, his driver's license would
have been revoked for a second time under W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-
2(i).See footnote 16 Engaging in this analysis, we do not find W. Va. Code, 17B-
3-5, to be flawed because it does not provide a revocation period.
Clearly, the Legislature intended the Drivers' License Compact and
W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, to work with other statutes concerning
In conclusion, after reviewing in pari materia, W. Va.
Code, 17C-5A-1, et seq., and W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, we find W. Va.
Code, 17B-3-5, does not require an administrative hearing prior to
revoking a driver's license if there has been a prior adjudication
establishing that the licensee is guilty of driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. The circuit court's order granting
a hearing under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, through either W. Va. Code,
17C-5A-1, or W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, constitutes an abuse of the
circuit court's authority and requires reversal. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Circuit Court of Braxton County is
reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded.
Footnote: 1 W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, provides, in pertinent part:
"The department shall forthwith
revoke the license of any operator . . . upon
receiving a record of such operator's . . .
conviction of any of the following offenses,
when such conviction has become final . . . :
* * *
"(6) Driving under the influence of alcohol . . . outside the state of West Virginia which conviction is under a municipal ordinance or statute of the United States or any other state of an offense which has the same elements as an offense described in section two [§ 17C-5-2], article five, chapter seventeen-c of this code[.]"
Footnote: 2 W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, was amended in 1993. However, even under the 1993 version, our analysis remains the same because neither version grants Mr. Sniffin a right to a hearing.
Footnote: 3 For the relevant text of W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5(6), see note 1, supra.
Footnote: 4 This section was amended in 1994. Mr. Sniffin did not assert in his petition to the circuit court that his conviction in Virginia would not have resulted in a conviction under W. Va. Code, 17C-5-2.
Footnote: 5 In his brief, Mr. Sniffin argues that "West Virginia Code 17B-5A, et. seq. provides the suspension periods for driving under the influence." There is no such section in the Code; however, W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-1, et seq., seems to fit Mr. Sniffin's argument.
Footnote: 6 The proper resolution of this case depends upon the correct interpretation and recognition of the interrelationship of various statutes. The cardinal rule in the construction of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the Legislature. State ex rel. Goff v. Merrifield, 191 W. Va. 473, 446 S.E.2d 695 (1994); Hechler v. McCusky, 179 W. Va. 129, 365 S.E.2d 793 (1987); State ex rel. Simpkins v. Harvey, 172 W. Va. 312, 305 S.E.2d 268 (1983). In the construction of a statute, the intentions of the Legislature are to be determined, not from "any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word," but rather from a general consideration of the statute in its entirety. Syllabus Point 1, in part, Mills v. VanKirk, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 22270 12/21/94), quoting Syllabus Point 3, in part, Pristavec v. Westfield, 184 W. Va. 331, 400 S.E.2d 575 (1990)). Accordingly, we will review the entire statutory scheme to ascertain the intentions of the Legislature.
Footnote: 7 For the relevant portion of W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, see note 1, supra.
Footnote: 8 Consistently, this Court has held that interpretations of
statutes by administrative bodies charged with enforcing such statutes are to be afforded great weight. See Syllabus Point 2, W. Va. Dept. of Health v. Blankenship, 189 W. Va. 342, 431 S.E.2d 681 (1993); W. Va. Nonintoxicating Beer Commr. v. A & H Tavern, 181 W. Va. 364, 282 S.E.2d 558 (1989); Dillon v. Board of Educ., 171 W. Va. 631, 301 S.E.2d 588 (1983); Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). Therefore, the DMV's construction of these statutes must be given substantial deference.
Footnote: 9 W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2(d), was amended in 1994. The amendment did not change the principal question of hearings under W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2, and only added a section allowing the DMV to propose certain legislative rules.
Footnote: 10 10In Bell, Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act provided that the motor vehicle registration and driver's license
of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident shall be suspended unless he or she posts security for the amount of damages claimed by an aggrieved party and excluded any consideration of fault or responsibility for the accident at a presuspension hearing. The Supreme Court held this statutory suspension procedure denied licensee's due process because they were not given an opportunity to show that there was no reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against the licensee. 402 U.S. at 540, 91 S. Ct. at 1590, 29 L.Ed.2d at 95. The Supreme Court held "that procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the licensee." 402 U.S. at 540, 91 S. Ct. at 1590, 29 L.Ed.2d at 95.
Footnote: 11 11The Arizona court also relied on relevant language in the Supreme Court opinion in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113-14, 97 S. Ct. 1723, 1728, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, 181 (1977):
"'In this case appellee had the opportunity
for a full judicial hearing in connection
with each of the traffic convictions on which
the Secretary's decision was based. Appellee
has not challenged the validity of those convictions or the adequacy of his procedural rights at the time they were determined. Since appellee does not dispute the factual basis for the Secretary's decision, he is really asserting the right to appear in person only to argue that the Secretary should show leniency and depart from his own regulations. Such an appearance might make the licensee feel that he has received more personal attention, but it would not serve to protect any substantive rights.'"
State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. at 93, 722 P.2d at 261, quoting Dixon v. Love, supra.
Footnote: 12 In Custis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994), the Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally permissible to bar virtually all collateral attacks upon prior state convictions being used for sentence enhancement in a federal trial. While a defendant may raise the "unique constitutional defect" of "failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant," challenge of other constitutional
defects, such as an invalid guilty plea, may constitutionally be barred entirely in this setting. ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 1738, 128 L.Ed.2d at 528. "Ease of administration" and the "interest in promoting the finality of judgments" (said to "bear extra weight in cases in which the prior convictions, such as [the] one challenged by Custis, are based on guilty pleas") were the considerations relied upon by the Custis Court in support of that conclusion. ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 1738-39, 128 L.Ed.2d at 528-29. Custis was cited and relied upon by this Court in State v. Day, 191 W. Va. 641, 447 S.E.2d 576 (1994).
Footnote: 13 Article III of W. Va. Code, 17B-1A-1, reads as follows:
Footnote: 14 W. Va. Code, 17B-1A-1 provides, in part:
"(a) The licensing authority in the home state, for the purposes of suspension, revocation or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to article III of this compact, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state, in the case of convictions for:
"(2) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug, or under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle."
Footnote: 15 The pertinent portions of W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2(i), reads as follows:
"If the commissioner finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person
did drive a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol . . . , the commissioner
shall revoke the person's license for a
period of six months: Provided, That if the
commissioner has previously suspended or
revoked the person's license under the
provisions of this section or section one [§
17C-5A-1] of this article, the period of
revocation shall be ten years: Provided,
however, That if the commissioner has
previously suspended or revoked the person's
license more than once under the provisions
of this section or section one [§ 17C-5A-1]
of this article, the period of revocation
shall be for the life of such person."
W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2, was amended in 1992 and 1994. W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2(i), remained substantially the same after the two amendments.
Footnote: 16 16We recently rejected a similar argument in Chapman v. W. Va. Department of Motor Vehicles, 188 W. Va. 216, 220-21, 423 S.E.2d 619, 623-24 (1992). In Chapman, the driver contended that a ten- year suspension was unwarranted because a violation of W.Va. Code, 17C-5-2 is not covered under the enhancement provisions of W.Va. Code, 17C-5-7. Pointing to the specific language of the W.Va. Code, 17C-5-7, this Court held that under the very terms of the statute the ten year enhancement provision applies to anyone who previously has been convicted of DUI under W.Va. Code, 17C-5-2. We reach the same conclusion in this case.