Gregory A. Corliss, Janet Stine, Paul Burke,
Archibald M. S. Morgan, III, Lillian Potter Saum
and Suellen Myers, Appellees
J. Michael Cassell
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Charles Town, WV
Attorney for the Appellee,
Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals
Peter L. Chakamakian
Charles Town, West Virginia
Richard G. Gay
Nathan P. Cochran
Berkeley Springs, WV
Attorneys for the Appellants
JUSTICE ALBRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE McGRAW dissents.
2. In cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the
administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate
disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and
reviews questions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 2, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474
S.E.2d 518 (1996).
3. Interpretations of statutes by bodies charged with their administration are
given great weight unless clearly erroneous. Syl. Pt. 4, Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
First W. Va. Bancorp., 166 W.Va. 775, 277 S.E.2d 613 (1981).
4. While the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its
administration should ordinarily be afforded deference, when that interpretation is unduly
restrictive and in conflict with the legislative intent, the agency's interpretation is
inapplicable. Syl. Pt. 5, Hodge v. Ginsburg, 172 W.Va. 17, 303 S.E.2d 245 (1983).
5. To entitle a property owner to certiorari to review the action of a city
council in vacating and closing a street, the petitioner must allege that his property abuts on
that part of the street vacated, or that he will suffer special or peculiar damage or
inconvenience not common to all. Syl. Pt. 2, Barker v. City of Charleston, 134 W.Va. 754,
61 S.E.2d 743 (1950).
6. A person qualifies as aggrieved within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 8-24-59 (1969) (Repl. Vol. 1998) and thereby has standing to challenge a decision or order of the Board of Zoning Appeals as illegal where the individual demonstrates that, as a result of the challenged ruling, he/she will uniquely suffer injury separate and apart from that which the general citizenry might experience as a result of the same ruling.
Arcadia Building Company (Arcadia) and William and Ginger Henderson (See footnote 1) appeal from the February 14, 2002, decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County in which the conditional use permit previously issued to them by the Jefferson County Planning Commission (Commission) was vacated. Arcadia had sought and obtained the permit for the purpose of developing a residential subdivision known as Harvest Hills. Six individual landowners (See footnote 2) (hereinafter referred to as Landowners) sought review by the circuit court of the administrative decision to issue a specialized zoning permit for the Harvest Hills development. (See footnote 3) The Landowners objected to the proposed development based on concerns that residential use of the land would negatively affect their agrarian use of neighboring property. Arcadia (See footnote 4) argues that, in reversing the decision of the Appellee Jefferson County Zoning Board of Appeals (Zoning Board), the circuit court wrongly substituted its judgment for that of the Zoning Board and circumvented established rules of review.
Having carefully reviewed this matter, we find that the lower court erred in overturning the
Zoning Board's decision by not adhering to the limited scope of review applicable to this
type of administrative proceeding and by altering the established manner in which adjacent
property measurements are determined for purposes of evaluating a conditional use permit
application. Accordingly, we reverse.
Pursuant to the procedures known as the Development Review System
(DRS), which are set forth in the Ordinance, the Commission undertook an evaluation to
determine whether the requested conditional use permit should be issued. As part of that
process, a Land Evaluation and Site Assessment (LESA) was performed by the Zoning
Administrator, Paul Raco. The LESA evaluation utilizes a numeric rating scale which
involves two components: a soils assessment that accounts for 25% of the LESA score and
an amenities assessment that accounts for the remaining 75% of the LESA score. Upon the
conclusion of the LESA evaluation, the combined score of these two components was
(See footnote 7)
Only if this score was 60 or less could the DRS process continue. Given the
appropriate range of the LESA score, the proposed development proceeded to the
Compatibility Assessment Meeting. This stage of the review process provides a public
forum for local citizens to voice their specific concerns about the development under
Following proper notice, (See footnote 8) a Compatibility Assessment Meeting was held on February 28, 2001. At this meeting, which was attended by both the Landowners and other interested citizens, numerous concerns were raised in connection with the proposed development. (See footnote 9) Arcadia, as reflected by the Staff Report prepared by the Commission, agreed to take specific action with regard to seventeen enumerated concerns that were raised at the meeting. (See footnote 10) Because there were six unresolved issues (See footnote 11) that surfaced during the meeting, a public hearing was scheduled for May 22, 2001, to address those specific issues.
Within a week of the compatibility meeting, two of the Landowners
(See footnote 12)
filed two separate appeals with the Zoning Board. In the first appeal, they averred that the
Commission and/or the Zoning Administrator miscalculated the LESA score. They argued
that if the Ordinance been properly applied with regard to the factors of adjacent
development; proximity to schools; public water availability; and public sewer availability,
the LESA score would have exceeded the maximum of 60. In a second appeal filed by these
same Landowners, they alleged that the data submitted by Arcadia in support of its
conditional use permit application was legally insufficient. After consolidating the two
appeals, the Zoning Board held a public hearing on these issues on April 19, 2001. The
Board, following the presentation of argument, voted to deny the appeal.
(See footnote 13)
On May 17,
2001, the Board issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support of both of its
decisions to deny the Landowners' challenges.
(See footnote 14)
The public hearing previously scheduled by the Commission to address the
(See footnote 15)
took place on May 22, 2001. After hearing the proffers of Arcadia
pertaining to these issues, the Commission voted 8 to 3 to approve the issuance of the
conditional use permit. The Landowners utilized the statutory remedy of applying for a writ
(See footnote 16)
to obtain judicial review of the Zoning Board's decision. Like the Zoning
Board, the circuit court consolidated the two appeals for purposes of its review. On
February 14, 2002, the lower court issued its decision in which it vacated the Zoning
Board's decision to issue the conditional use permit and remanded the matter to the
Commission for further proceedings consistent with the circuit court's rulings. As support
for its ruling, the lower court found error with regard to the underlying administrative
determinations concerning the adequacy of the submitted support data and found the method
by which the Zoning Administrator measured adjacent development in conjunction with the
amenities component of the LESA score to be inconsistent with the Ordinance's purposes.
(See footnote 17)
Arcadia appeals from the lower court's decision to vacate the administrative decision to
issue the conditional use permit, a decision that was initially reached by the Commission and
subsequently affirmed by the Zoning Board.
We have further recognized that [i]n cases where the circuit court has
amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of
the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an
abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 2, Muscatell
v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996). With these standards in mind, we proceed
to consider the parties' arguments.
Essentially dismissing the Board's recognition that the Ordinance does not require specified
levels of detail, the lower court downplayed the significance of the Board's position in favor
of correcting an improper interpretation and application of the law.
In section 7.4(g), the Ordinance squarely addresses who has responsibility for
finding submitted support data to be inadequate: The Zoning Administrator shall determine
if the sketch plan and support data are adequate. In this case, the submission of Arcadia's
support data did not prompt the Zoning Administrator to make a finding of inadequacy.
When this issue was presented on appeal, the Zoning Board concluded:
that the Appellants fail to demonstrate that the Zoning Administrator abused his discretion or failed to render his determination regarding the adequacy of the plan and support data in conformity with Section 7.4. The Board rejects the Appellants['] contention that the support data and sketch plan are wholly inadequate for an informed public discussion regarding this project. (emphasis supplied)
Dismissing the value of the Board's finding, the lower court determined in conclusory
fashion that no serious review of the adequacy of the support data was made.
Making its own findings on the issue of adequacy, the lower court stated as
The support data packet submitted by the Developers failed to address the following specific items required by the Ordinance: type and frequency of traffic; adequacy of existing transportation routes; locations of signs; and did not contain a discussion of ground water or of the project's effect upon wildlife populations. These omissions, and the abbreviated nature of the support data narrative in general, are inconsistent with the purposes for the requirement of providing support data set forth in the Ordinance, i.e., public review in preparation for a dialogue as to compatibility and as material upon which the Commission will base, in part, its decision whether to issue the conditional use permit.
Our review of the record discloses that Arcadia did in fact address each of the twenty-three areas of required support data. For example, as to the category of effected wildlife populations, Arcadia responded: There are no known rare or endangered species of wildlife indigenous to this site. Two letters have been received from the DNR[;] they are attached as exhibits. Wildlife populations will not be affected although some nests or dens of individual animals may be displaced. In similar fashion, there was information supplied with regard to the category designated as ground water and surface water and sewer lines within 1320 feet: Elk Branch borders the northern property boundary. This stream is well defined with, stable vegetated banks. There are no sewer lines within 1320 feet. As to the category of traffic characteristics-type and frequency of traffic; adequacy of existing transportation routes, the support data supplied the following information:
This site will generate the usual residential traffic. It is anticipated that many of the home buyers, at least the ones who are commuters, may take advantage of the proximity to the rail stop and commute to their jobs by train. The developer has been talking to the West Virginia State Highway Department for several months about removal of the curves to the south of the property. The developer expects to share in the cost of this work.
Upon our review of the support data, we can reach only one conclusion _
while the circuit court may have been correct in its characterization of the support data as
abbreviated, there was no failure of Arcadia to provide information responsive to the
twenty-three categories and certainly there was no omission of information that would rise
to the level of inadequacy in terms of the Ordinance's purpose of requiring the submission
of support data. The Zoning Administrator was correct in his observation that the Ordinance
simply lists things to address. It doesn't explain what is acceptable. In conducting its
review on the issue of adequacy, the lower court appears to have been overly focused on
quantitative concerns, given its observation that for a project of this size, the intent of the
Ordinance's support data provisions is not served by the submission of four pages of
narrative containing a mere 103 lines of responsive material (aside from the soils data) in
addressing the 23 data points as to which information is sought.
That the lower court recognized the objective underlying the support data
requirement is clear from its finding that the purpose . . . is to reveal issues relating to
compatibility and to provoke discussion among the developer/landowner, the interested
public and the county's land use officials as to matters that would be relevant to
compatibility. The Staff Notes from the Compatibility Assessment Meeting make clear that
a comprehensive and seemingly thorough public review of the Harvest Hills development
did take place and, as a result of that public scrutiny, specific agreements were reached
addressing the majority of the concerns raised by the citizens who attended this meeting.
(See footnote 20)
As discussed above, those issues that could not be resolved during the first public meeting
were scheduled for further discussion at a subsequent public hearing. On review, the DRS
process appears to have worked in its intended fashion by providing a public forum to
address and seek resolution of pertinent development-related issues. Accordingly, we
cannot concur with the circuit court's conclusion that the support data and its level of detail
somehow operated to thwart the Ordinance's objective of public review.
(See footnote 21)
Based on the broadly-worded categories of support data combined with the
Ordinance's unmistakable purpose of requiring this data to facilitate an informed public
discussion, we cannot conclude that a quantitative analysis of the support data is the
manner in which the standard of adequacy is to be determined under the Ordinance. Neither
are we able to hone in some fashion how much detail is required with regard to examining
support data for purposes of adequacy. In this Court's opinion, the key to determining
adequacy has to be based on whether the support data was sufficient in terms of enabling the
desired public debate to occur with regard to the proposed development. Both the Zoning
Administrator and the Zoning Board found the support data submitted by Arcadia adequate
to enable the desired goal of public discourse on the proposed development. Moreover, the
record makes clear that a detailed public debate did occur and furthermore, that Arcadia
agreed to take specific action in response to the bulk of public concerns raised at the
Compatibility Assessment Meeting.
(See footnote 22)
Given the manner in which the public appeared,
raised particularized concerns, and action, or agreement to take action, resulted with regard
to those concerns, it appears that the DRS process worked in the fashion intended by the
In discarding the administrative determinations that the submitted support data
was adequate, the lower court appears to have wrongly substituted its judgment for that of
the administrative entities charged with handling zoning matters. It is axiomatic that
[i]nterpretations of statutes by bodies charged with their administration are given great
weight unless clearly erroneous. Syl. Pt. 4, Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First W. Va.
Bancorp., 166 W.Va. 775, 277 S.E.2d 613 (1981). The record in this case suggests that the
lower court overlooked its duty to give the appropriate amount of deference to the
administrative decision and Zoning Board's affirmance of that decision regarding the
adequacy of the support data. While acknowledging on the one hand that [m]atters that are
within the Commission's expertise . . . would be best left to the Commission in the first
instance for purposes of determining the appropriate support data that is required, the
circuit court proceeded to make its own findings on the issue and to further suggest that the
Commission should implement usage of forms containing questions that might prompt a
more thorough response to the support data categories.
Were the submission of the support data an end in itself to the DRS process,
we might be more inclined to agree with the circuit court's suggestion that extensive detail
is required when such data is initially submitted as part of the conditional use permit
application. Importantly, that support data provides a launching point from which the public
can begin to participate in and the Zoning Administrator and the Commission can conduct
the multi-stage reviewing process that is involved in any application for a conditional use
permit. Given the clear purpose of the support data to provide a mechanism for public
debate relevant to such areas and the undisputed evidence that such public debate did freely
occur in this matter,
(See footnote 23)
we cannot agree with the circuit court's finding that the support data
was inadequate or that the determinations made by the Commission and the Zoning Board
on this issue were incorrect. Accordingly, we find that the lower court abused its discretion
in reversing the Zoning Board on this issue.
The lower court expressly found that [t]he Ordinance specifies no measurement method and that [t]he Zoning Administrator measured the adjacent land by linear boundaries. As to the longstanding practice of the Zoning Administrator _ since the enactment of the Ordinance in 1988 to utilize the linear method of land measurement _ the circuit court found: The record reflects that the Zoning Administrator has followed the linear boundary method of measurement in this context for many years, and that it is also the method he has utilized in evaluating land usage in the context of other conditional use permit requests under the Ordinance.
When this issue was appealed by the Landowners to the Zoning Board, the
Board found as follows:
5. The Board concludes that the assessment of points for Adjacent Development should be calculated by measuring the boundaries of adjacent parcels and then determining the uses of each adjacent parcel. The Board rejects the Appellants' [Landowners] contention that the land area or acreage of the adjacent parcels of land should be the proper method of measurement.
6. The Board concludes that the operative language contained in Section 6.4(b) is adjacent development and adjacent land. The word adjacent is defined by Websters New World College Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1999, as that which is adjoining, i.e.: something that touches something else at some point or along a line.
7. The Board concludes that Section 6.4(b) does not specify land area or acreage as the proper measurement of adjacent land or adjacent development. The Board would further note that specific definitions of land area and lot area are contained in the Definition section of the Ordinance.
8. Therefore, the Board concludes that the Zoning Administrator's assessment of points of adjacent development is in conformity with Section 6.4(b) and should be affirmed.
As its justification for replacing the established linear method of measuring adjacent land for purposes of conditional use permit applications with its preferred acreage method, the circuit court offered:
The Court has given this matter careful consideration and is compelled to agree with Petitioners [Landowners] that while the Ordinance fails to specify a method to be used, the land area method of measurement appears, in this context, to be much more consistent with the expressed purposes and intent of the Development Review System, Conditional Use Permit process, the Comprehensive Plan, and the Code. The Court agrees with Petitioners that the boundary method of measurement appears to disfavor farmland preservation and to favor development. The Court believes this is because the boundary method of measurement fails to take account of the depth of adjacent parcels. The Court sees no reason that a method of measurement should be used which, although it is simpler than measuring by land area, ignores the true size of the adjacent parcels.
Just as the circuit court completely sidestepped the Board's decision as to adequacy, the court similarly ignored the expertise the administrative entities involved in this case have developed with regard to land measurement and its consequent obligation to accord such expertise/judgment a significant level of deference barring any clear error. The lower court appears to have wholly disregarded its obligation to accord a presumption of correctness with regard to the Board's long term approach to this issue of measuring adjacent parcels of land for purposes of calculating one aspect of the LESA score. See Wolfe, 159 W.Va. at 35, 217 S.E.2d at 900, syl. pt. 5. As justification for its decision to alter the established method of land measurement, the lower court cited syllabus point five of Hodge v. Ginsburg, 172 W.Va. 17, 303 S.E.2d 245 (1983), in which this Court held that [w]hile the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration should ordinarily be afforded deference, when that interpretation is unduly restrictive and in conflict with the legislative intent, the agency's interpretation is inapplicable. Given the absence of any explanation as to how the lower court concluded that the linear method of land measurement was either unduly restrictive or in conflict with the legislative intent, other than indicating a preference for a method of measurement favoring farmland preservation over development, the lower court appears to have simply rewritten (See footnote 26) the Ordinance to reach a different result in terms of the LESA score. (See footnote 27) See Syl. Pt. 1, Consumer Advocate Div. v. PSC, 182 W.Va. 152, 386 S.E.2d 650 (1989) (holding that [a] statute, or an administrative rule, may not, under the guise of 'interpretation,' be modified, revised, amended or rewritten).
Arcadia argues that the lower court wrongly elevated the goals of the
(See footnote 28)
over the objectives of the Ordinance
(See footnote 29)
in its effort to adopt a land
measuring method that would favor farmland preservation. In so doing, Arcadia suggests
that the circuit court circumscribed this Court's clear recognition in Singer that the
comprehensive plan is to be used by the Planning Commission to aid them in drawing up
their subdivision ordinances and that such plans were never intended to replace definite,
specific guidelines; instead, it was to lay the groundwork for the future enactment of zoning
laws. 164 W.Va. at 668, 264 S.E.2d at 640. We further clarified that the comprehensive
plan had no effect as a separate legal instrument. Ibid.
Arcadia and the Zoning Board argue that the lower court wrongly elevated the
importance of the Comprehensive Plan, observing that the court selectively excised only
those portions of the Comprehensive Plan which pertain to the preservation of agriculture.
Rather than placing the Comprehensive Plan in its proper context _ as a reference for
purposes of applying the Ordinance
(See footnote 30)
_ the lower court declared the Plan and the Ordinance
to be on equal footing for purposes of resolving any issues involving interpretation.
Evidence of the weight accorded to the Comprehensive Plan by the circuit court is found in
the court's declaration that it interprets the ordinances in pari materia with the
Comprehensive Plan and should, to the extent feasible, construe the ordinances to be
consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. Following this pronouncement in its order, the
circuit court proceeded to set forth only those goals or statements from the Comprehensive
Plan which pertain to farm industry preservation. Our review of the record suggests that the
lower court did place undue emphasis on the singular concern of agricultural preservation
when in fact this particular objective is but one of many goals identified in either the
Ordinance or the Plan.
(See footnote 31)
Given the lower court's emphasis on agricultural preservation, it is difficult
to conclude that the lower court's finding on the issue of land measurement was not affected
by this seemingly singular focus. In rather arbitrarily adopting an entirely new method of
land measurement _ one that significantly differs from that used by the Commission for over
thirteen years _ we are inclined to agree with the Zoning Board's position that the lower
court has usurped the legislative function accorded to the Commission in whose
responsibility the drafting of such zoning ordinances is reposed. Critically, the lower court
did not find error through the use of the linear method of land measurement _ only that the
method of acreage measurement was more consistent with the Comprehensive Plan and the
goal of farmland preservation. Were farmland preservation the only interest that was sought
to be protected through both the Comprehensive Plan and the Ordinance, we might be able
to find some merit in the lower court's findings relevant to land measurement. Since that
is not the case, however, we are compelled to reach the conclusion that the lower court
committed error in altering the established method of measuring adjacent land for purposes
of evaluating applications seeking a conditional use permit.
In challenging the Landowners' standing, Arcadia posited that their only
interest in the Harvest Hills project arises from concerns about residential growth,
overcrowded schools, inadequacy of essential public services such as sewer and water
service, a lowering water table, and increased and congested traffic. Submitting that these
generalized concerns failed to differentiate these particular citizens from any other Jefferson
County landowners, Arcadia contended that the Landowners could not meet the test
established by this Court in Barker v. City of Charleston, 134 W.Va. 754, 61 S.E.2d 743
(1950). In syllabus point two of Barker, we held that
To entitle a property owner to certiorari to review the action of a city council in vacating and closing a street, the petitioner must allege that his property abuts on that part of the street vacated, or that he will suffer special or peculiar damage or inconvenience not common to all.
This Court observed in Barker that
the petition contained no allegation to the effect that any of the properties of petitioners fronted or abutted on that part of the street or alleys vacated and closed, or to the effect that the vacating and closing of the same would in any way injure, prejudice or inconvenience petitioners, or any of them, in any manner, except to the extent that such injury, prejudice or inconvenience would be suffered by all others of the community wherein the properties of petitioners are situated.
Id. at 756, 61 S.E.2d at 745.
In rejecting Arcadia's standing arguments, the lower court found that there is uncontroverted evidence in the record that Myers, Stine and Corliss are farmers and
residents of the area immediately surrounding Duffields, where Harvest Hills would be
located. The circuit court found further that Myers, Stine and Corliss (or persons in their
employ) of necessity must upon occasion utilize Flowing Springs Road to traverse from one
portion of their farm to another with tractors and related implements. Based on their
proximity to the proposed development and their occupation as farmers, the lower court
concluded that Petitioners Myers, Stine, and Corliss have an interest in this matter that is
different from the interests of other citizens at large. Determining that the Landowners had
made the requisite factual showing of alleged 'distinct' or 'peculiar' harm, the circuit court
found no procedural impediment to the review sought by the Landowners.
(See footnote 32)
In resolving the issue of who qualifies as aggrieved within the meaning of
West Virginia Code § 8-24-59, the circuit court concluded
that individuals such as petitioners who live in close proximity to the project, who farm, and who demonstrate that their farming activities are at risk of being deleteriously affected or even terminated by conditions expected to be generated or worsened by the project, such as increased traffic, a lowering ground water table, crowding, and the myriad problems that would appear to attend the juxtaposition in close proximity of farms and farmers with more or less suburban-style residents of single-family houses (including, as has been suggested, liability exposure, nuisance lawsuits, noise, dust and smell complaints, cut fences, and children enticed to play with horses or other livestock), have standing to challenge the major decisions of the county's local governing bodies approving a conditional use permit. . . .(footnote omitted)
Notwithstanding Arcadia's strenuous protests on this issue, we find no basis for finding error with regard to the lower court's finding that the Landowners qualified as aggrieved persons who thereby had standing to challenge the issuance of the conditional use permit. While the Landowners involved did raise concerns that at first blush might appear to be in common with all the citizens of Jefferson County, such as increased traffic, water table lowering, and other growth-related effects on the existing infrastructure, they proceeded to demonstrate how those concerns would bring about particularized harm given their specific occupational needs as farmers. Accordingly, we hold that a person qualifies as aggrieved within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 8-24-59 and thereby has standing to challenge a decision or order of the Board of Zoning Appeals as illegal where the individual demonstrates that, as a result of the challenged ruling, he/she will uniquely suffer injury separate and apart from that which the general citizenry might experience as a result of the same ruling.
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County
reversing the issuance of the conditional use permit by the Jefferson County Board of
Zoning Appeals is hereby reversed and the matter is referred back to the Commission for the
express purpose of reinstating the conditional use permit that was previously issued to
Springs Road) if title is obtained by the West Virginia
Department of Highways to do so;
3 3. Install no street lighting;
4 4. Disclose to potential buyers the intensity of the train traffic;
5 5. Build a fence between the development and the railroad tracks;
6 6. Discuss and encourage telecommunications link-ups with utility companies;
7 7. Inform potential buyers of farming activities in the area (i.e. smells, noises, animals, equipment) and the farmers right to farm;
8 8. Prepare a traffic study;
9 9. Install a traffic light at the intersection of Route 17 and Melvin Road if warranted by the West Virginia Department of Highways;
10 10. Provide quality control of storm water management to County standards;
11 11. Provide buffers to lessen the impact of the development on the Duffield's historic area;
12 12. Not to increase the density more than what is currently proposed;
13 13. Not to relinquish any property they do not own;
14 14. Provide a fence between the development and Sullen Myers property;
15 15. Provide economic study to determine the cost of services versus tax collections;
16 16. Not locate a water tank on the property;
17 17. Give the land earmarked for the School Board to the Jefferson County Parks and Recreation Commission or other sports organization if not used by the School Board.
any lawsuit if someone from the development trespasses
onto her property and is injured;
21 4. Provide economic study to determine the cost of services versus tax collections and add that amount to the sale of the lot as an impact fee;
22 5. Provide a historic and archeological study of the property;
23 6. Reduce the density.
undeveloped category, the award is only 1 point. Based on the land measurement calculations performed by the Zoning Administrator in this case, the percentage of undeveloped land was determined to be 72.4% based on the linear method, which resulted in a LESA assessment of 6 for the adjacent development component.
agricultural activities while maintaining land use, order
g (g) Encourage an improved appearance of Jefferson County with relationship to the use and development of land and structures.
h (h) Encourage the conservation of natural resources.
ix (i) Provide a guide for public action in the orderly and efficient provision of public facilities and services.
j (j) Provide a guide for private enterprise in developing and building a strong economic community.
k (k) Encourage historic preservation.