David L. Hill, Esq.
Hamlin, West Virginia
Attorney for W. G. Stanley
Kimberly D. Bentley, Esq.
Assistant General Counsel
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources
Bureau for Child Support Enforcement
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for WV DHHR, BCSE
Bruce G. Perrone, Esq.
Legal Aid of West Virginia
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
JUSTICE MAYNARD delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE DAVIS concurs, in part, dissents, in part, and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
1. The ten-year statute of limitations set forth in W.Va. Code, 38-3-18  and not the doctrine of laches applies when enforcing a decretal judgment which orders the payment of monthly sums for alimony or child support. Syllabus Point 6, Robinson v. McKinney, 189 W.Va. 459, 432 S.E.2d 543 (1993).
2. The limitation provided in Code, 38-3-18, applied to a decretal judgment payable in installments, commences to run when each installment becomes due, as to the part of said judgment then payable. Syllabus Point 3, Korczyk v. Solonka, 130 W.Va. 211, 42 S.E.2d 814 (1947).
3. A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect. Syllabus Point 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951).
4. In the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, words used in a statute will be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning. Syllabus Point 1, Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. Mingo Cty. Comm., 164 W.Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979).
5. The procedure utilized by the Bureau for Child Support Enforcement to obtain payment of past due child support from Federal and State tax refunds from overpayments made to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States or the State Tax Commissioner, as provided for in W.Va. Code § 48-18-117 (2001) and W.Va. Code § 48-18- 118 (2001), does not constitute an execution of a judgment under W.Va. Code § 38-3-18 (1923) for the purpose of tolling the ten-year limitation period for the execution of an issuance on a judgment.
6. Laches is a delay in the assertion of a known right which works to the disadvantage of another, or such delay as will warrant the presumption that the party has waived his right. Syllabus Point 2, Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123 W.Va. 608, 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941).
7. The constitutional immunity of the state from suit extends to its governmental agencies. Syllabus Point 2, in part, Stewart v. State Road Comm'n, 117 W.Va. 352, 185 S.E. 567 (1936).
8. Suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State. Syllabus Point 2, Pittsburgh Elevator v. W.Va. Bd. of Regents, 172 W.Va. 743, 310 S.E.2d 675 (1983).
9. W.Va. Code, 29-12-5(a) (1986), provides an exception for the State's constitutional immunity found in Section 35 of Article VI of the West Virginia Constitution. It requires the State Board of Risk and Insurance Management to purchase or contract for insurance and requires that such insurance policy 'shall provide that the insurer shall be barred and estopped from relying upon the constitutional immunity of the State of West Virginia against claims or suits. Syllabus Point 1, Eggleston v. W.Va. Dept. of Highways,
189 W.Va. 230, 429 S.E.2d 636 (1993).
The appellant, the Bureau for Child Support Enforcement (BCSE), appeals
the April 27, 2001, order of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County that holds the BCSE and
Nada Stanley jointly and severally liable to pay to the appellee, Wetzel Garry Stanley,
$19,837.96, which the court determined to be an overpayment of child support paid by Mr.
By order of August 1, 1980, Nada Stanley was granted judgment against Mr.
Stanley in the amount of $1000 for unpaid child support. On or about June 16, 1981, a writ
of execution and suggestion were filed in an attempt to execute the judgment award.
In 1982, the appellant, the Bureau for Child Support Enforcement (BCSE),
intercepted the income tax refund of Mr. Stanley for tax year 1981 for unpaid child support.
According to Mr. Stanley's counsel during oral argument before this Court, for the next
several years Mr. Stanley did what he could to meet his child support obligation and
occasionally made cash payments directly to Ms. Stanley. He admitted, however, that the
total amount paid was minimal. During this time, no official action was taken by the
BCSE or Ms. Stanley to enforce Mr. Stanley's child support obligation, although Mr. Stanley
apparently received regular billing statements and letters from the BCSE in an effort to
collect child support. According to the BCSE, for the tax years 1989 through 1997, it
regularly attempted unsuccessfully to intercept Mr. Stanley's income tax refunds.
In October 1993, Ms. Stanley filed a petition for contempt against Mr. Stanley
for his failure to pay child support. Later that month, the BCSE issued a Notice To Source
Of Income To Initiate Withholding to the Social Security Administration to withhold
specified amounts to meet Mr. Stanley's child support obligations. In December 1993, Mr.
Stanley received a Social Security disability backpay award of about $20,000, from which
there was no withholding.
(See footnote 3)
Also in December 1993, Mr. Stanley filed a petition for
determination of arrears. Although a hearing was held before a family law master
(See footnote 4)
parties' petitions, no order was entered as a result of the hearing.
On March 11, 1997, the BCSE issued to the Workers' Compensation Division
a Notice To Employer/Source Of Income To Initiate Withholding. As a result, in March
1997, the BCSE intercepted $32,796.60 from a Workers' Compensation lump sum award to
Mr. Stanley for the payment of child support arrearage. This money was then forwarded to
In October 1997, Mr. Stanley filed a petition for modification of child support
in which he requested that the BCSE withholdings from his monthly Social Security check
be terminated. After a hearing in February 1998, the family law master entered an April 9,
1998, order in which she rejected Mr. Stanley's claim that the statute of limitations barred
collection of a portion of the arrearage.
(See footnote 5)
She also gave Mr. Stanley a credit toward the
arrearage for Social Security benefits paid directly to Nada Stanley on behalf of the couple's
children in the amounts of $96 per month from February 1994 through November 1994; $98
per month from December 1994 through May 1995; and a lump sum payment of $2,745.90
in 1993. In addition, the family law master awarded to the BCSE a decretal judgment against
Mr. Stanley in the amount of $2,896.76, as reimbursement of welfare benefits formerly paid
to Nada Stanley. Finally, the family law master ordered that income withholding from Mr.
Stanley's monthly social security check be limited to $300. This recommended order was
erroneously entered on April 9, 1998, absent the opportunity afforded by the ten-day period
in which to file exceptions to a recommended order of a family law master. Accordingly, by
orders of November 23, 1998 and January 22, 1999, the circuit court set aside the order, and
regarded it as a valid family law master's order to which exceptions could be filed within ten
Mr. Stanley filed exceptions to the family law master's recommended order
based on its failure to apply the ten-year statute of limitations for the execution of judgments
in W.Va. Code § 38-3-18. Subsequently, the circuit court held that Nada Stanley and the
BCSE failed to pursue collection of child support between the writ of execution filed in 1981
and the contempt petition filed in 1993. Therefore, the ten-year statute of limitations barred
collection of child support owed prior to October 1, 1983 which was ten years prior to Nada
Stanley's contempt petition. Accordingly, the circuit court ordered the BCSE to recalculate
the child support arrearage owed by Mr. Stanley.
Following the recalculation, the circuit court granted judgment to Mr. Stanley
against Nada Stanley for an overpayment of child support in the amount of $17,855.49, plus
interest. The BCSE was ordered to return any held monies to Mr. Stanley and cease
Mr. Stanley subsequently filed a motion to clarify the circuit court's order
requesting that the BCSE, in addition to Nada Stanley, also be held responsible for refunding
the overpayment. The circuit court found the BCSE jointly and severally liable for the
repayment because it breached its duty to forward the withholdings to the proper party.
It is now known that Nada Stanley received a discharge in bankruptcy of all
debts and claims, including the claim asserted by Mr. Stanley for child support overpayment.
Accordingly, the BCSE is now solely responsible to Mr. Stanley for the overpayment of his
child support obligations pursuant to the circuit court's order.
(See footnote 6)
The first issue before this Court is whether the circuit court erred in its
application of the time limitation for execution of judgments found in W.Va. Code § 38-3-18
(1923), which states:
On a judgment, execution may be issued within ten years after the date thereof. Where execution issues within ten years as aforesaid, other executions may be issued on such judgment within ten years from the return day of the last execution issued thereon, on which there is no return by an officer or which has been returned unsatisfied. An action, suit or scire facias may be brought upon a judgment where there has been a change of parties by death or otherwise at any time within ten years next after the date of the judgment; or within ten years from the return day of the last execution issued thereon on which there is no return by an officer or which has been returned unsatisfied. But if such action, suit or scire facias be against the personal representative of a decedent, it shall be brought within five years from the qualification of such representative.
The circuit court found,
that there is no exception to the 10-year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code Section . . . 38-3-18. In Zanke v. Zanke, 185 W.Va. 1, 404 S.E.2d 92 (1991), the Court reaffirmed this principal [sic]. Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that . . . the plaintiff and the State of West Virginia are barred by the statute of limitations from collecting any past due child support which was payable prior to October, 1983, including the 1980 judgment. The Child Support Enforcement Division shall recompute the defendant's arrearage beginning with a zero balance due on October 1, 1983[.]
Initially, we conclude that the manner in which the circuit court applied the time limitation in W.Va. Code § 38-3-18 is correct. There is no dispute that the limitation period in W.Va. Code § 38-3-18 applies to the collection of child support judgments. According to Syllabus Point 6 of Robinson v. McKinney, 189 W.Va. 459, 432 S.E.2d 543 (1993), [t]he ten-year statute of limitations set forth in W.Va. Code, 38-3-18  and not the doctrine of laches applies when enforcing a decretal judgment which orders the payment of monthly sums for alimony or child support. In addition, it is well established that when a provision for periodic payments of child support is made in a divorce decree, these installments become decretal judgments as they become due. See Syllabus Point 1 of Goff v. Goff, 177 W.Va. 742, 356 S.E.2d 496 (1987) (holding that [m]atured installments provided for in a decree, which orders the payment of monthly sums for alimony or child support, stand as 'decretal judgments' against the party charged with the payments.). Finally, [t]he limitation provided in Code, 38-3-18, applied to a decretal judgment payable in installments, commences to run when each installment becomes due, as to the part of said judgment then payable. Syllabus Point 3, Korczyk v. Solonka, 130 W.Va. 211, 42 S.E.2d 814 (1947).
Applying these rules to the instant facts, because Nada Stanley filed her
Petition for Contempt of Court in October 1993, and more than ten years had passed since
she last attempted through court action to collect child support arrearages from Mr. Stanley,
the amount collectable under W.Va. Code § 38-3-18 is that portion of the arrearages that
accrued during the previous ten years. See Zanke v. Zanke, 185 W.Va. 1, 4, 404 S.E.2d 92,
95 (1991) (per curiam) (where on May 24, 1988, wife filed petition for contempt order and
for judgment for arrearage which had accrued since May 20, 1976, divorce order, Court
explained that under W.Va. Code § 38-3-18, [a] proper calculation would be to take the date
upon which suit was filed, May 24, 1988, and compute the alimony accrued during the
previous ten years.
However, the BCSE raises several challenges to the application of the ten-year
limitation period under the facts of this case. First, the BCSE avers that its attempts,
beginning in 1989, to intercept Mr. Stanley's income tax refunds for the purpose of satisfying
his past due child support obligations tolled the ten-year limitation period. In other words,
the BCSE says, in effect, that the income tax intercepts constituted executions under W.Va.
Code § 38-3-18, which served to toll the ten-year limitation period.
This issue is a matter of straightforward statutory interpretation. We have
previously held that [a] statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly
expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full
force and effect. Syllabus Point 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951).
In addition, [i]n the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, words used in a
statute will be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning. Syllabus Point 1, Tug
Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. Mingo Cty. Comm., 164 W.Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979).
We conclude that the word execution in W.Va. Code § 38-3-18 is unambiguous, and that
its common, ordinary and accepted meaning does not include income tax intercepts.
An execution upon a money judgment is defined as:
3. Judicial enforcement of a money judgment, usu. by seizing and selling the judgment debtor's property . . . .
4. A court order directing a sheriff or other officer to enforce a judgment, usu. by seizing and selling the judgment debtor's property . . . .
Black's Law Dictionary 589-90 (7th ed. 1999). It has also been defined as [a] process of the court. Specifically . . . a judicial writ issuing from the court where the judgment is rendered, directed to an officer thereof, and running against the body or goods of a party, by which the judgment of the court is enforced. 33 C.J.S. Executions § 2 (1998) (footnotes omitted). In West Virginia, the subject of executions is covered by statute. See W.Va. Code § 38-4-1, et seq. (See footnote 7) Executions for the specific purpose of collecting matured, unpaid child support are provided for in W.Va. Code § 48-14-201 (2001) (See footnote 8) which states:
When an obligor is in arrears in the payment of support which is required to be paid by the terms of an order for support of a child, an obligee or the bureau for child support enforcement may file an abstract of the order giving rise to the support obligation and an affidavit of accrued support, setting forth the particulars of such arrearage and requesting a writ of execution, suggestion (See footnote 9) or suggestee execution. (See footnote 10) The filing of the abstract and affidavit shall give rise, by operation of law, to a lien against personal property of an obligor who resides within this state or who owns property within this state for overdue support. (Footnotes added.).
Upon receipt of the affidavit, the clerk shall issue a writ of execution, suggestion or suggestee execution[.] W.Va. Code § 48-14-204(a) (Supp. 2001). We conclude, therefore, that an execution necessarily involves a court process wherein a judicial writ is issued.
Concerning the obtainment of past due child support from federal tax refunds,
also known as tax intercepts or tax offsets, W.Va. Code § 48-18-117 (2001) provides:
The [West Virginia Support Enforcement] commission shall, by legislative rule promulgated pursuant to chapter twenty-nine-a [§§ 29A-1-1 et seq.] of this code, place in effect procedures necessary for the bureau for child support enforcement to obtain payment of past due support from federal tax refunds from overpayments made to the secretary of the treasury of the United States. The bureau for child support enforcement shall take all steps necessary to implement and utilize such procedures.
Similarly, W.Va. Code § 48-18-118 (2001) provides that the State Tax Commissioner shall establish procedures for the Bureau for Child Support Enforcement to obtain payment of past due child support from state tax refunds wherein the Bureau may enforce a support order through a notice to the Commissioner which causes any refund of state income tax owed to the obligor to be reduced by the amount of overdue support owed by the obligor. (See footnote 11)
A comparison of the traditional definition of and procedure for the execution
of a judgment with the provisions for tax offsets indicates to this Court that a tax offset is not
an execution in that it does not involve a process of the court that results in the issuance of
a judicial writ. Rather, a tax offset is a purely administrative action initiated and carried out
by executive agencies. Further, this Court does not find dispositive the cases cited by the
BCSE for the proposition that actions other than executions may toll the limitation period in
W.Va. Code § 38-3-18 because these cases are completely devoid of any analysis or citation
of authority to support such a proposition. See Robinson v. McKinney, 189 W.Va. 459, 463,
432 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1993) (concluding that the mother is not barred by the statute of
limitations from collecting child support from September of 1982 until May of 1989 . . . since
the mother began the collection process in early 1992 by a Notice to Employer/Source of
Income dated February 18, 1992 and by a motion to establish arrearages dated March 12,
1992.); Clay v. Clay, 206 W.Va. 564, 568, 526 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1999) (stating that the
appellee began the collection process on August 27, 1998, by filing an Order/Notice to
Withhold Income for Child Support[,] therefore the appellee may not collect child support
for the time period prior to August 27, 1988.); and State ex rel. DHHR Schwab v. Schwab,
206 W.Va. 551, 554, 526 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1999) (finding that [t]he motion to enforce the
accrued child support payments was filed in February 1998[,] therefore, the appellees may
only enforce support payments due after February 1988.).
Accordingly, we hold that the procedure utilized by the Bureau for Child
Support Enforcement to obtain payment of past due child support from Federal and State tax
refunds from overpayments made to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States or the
State Tax Commissioner, as provided in W.Va. Code § 48-18-117 (2001) and W.Va. Code
§ 48-18-118 (2001), does not constitute an execution of a judgment under W.Va. Code § 38-
3-18 (1923) for the purpose of tolling the ten-year limitation period for the issuance of an
execution on a judgment.
(See footnote 12)
The BCSE argues, however, that it was improper for the circuit court to apply the statute of limitations retroactively to arrears that had already been collected. According to the BCSE, the time limitation may apply only to unpaid debts on which no collection efforts have been taken in ten years. Otherwise, claims the BCSE, the circuit court lacks authority to retroactively modify an arrearage calculation. We do not believe that this argument withstands close scrutiny.
As noted above, the BCSE received $32,796.60 from Mr. Stanley's Workers'
Compensation award by means of income withholding pursuant to W.Va. Code §§ 48-14-401
et seq. While such withholding requires notice to the obligor advising him, inter alia, of his
right to challenge the amount of the withholding, significantly, income withholding is not
stayed while the withholding is being contested in the court system. See W.Va. Code § 48-
14-405(12) (Supp. 2001) (That while the withholding is being contested through the court,
the income withholding may not be stayed, but may be modified.). If this Court were toaccept the BCSE's position that the ten-year limitation period applies only to uncollected or
unpaid arrearages, an obligor's statute of limitation defense to the withholding of income
would always fail due to the fact that the arrearages at issue had already been collected by
the time the challenge to the withholding is resolved. In short, the ten-year statute of
limitation would be rendered void in cases in which the BCSE utilizes income withholding
to collect child support arrearages. Accordingly, we reject the BCSE's argument on this
The BCSE next contends that Mr. Stanley did not timely raise the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, and cites Dept. of Health v. Robert Morris N., 195 W.Va. 759, 466 S.E.2d 827 (1995), and Rule 8 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure for the proposition that the statute of limitations defense should have been included in a written pleading filed by Mr. Stanley. According to the BCSE, although it intercepted the $32,796.60 on or about March 29, 1997, Mr. Stanley did not raise the statute of limitation issue until he did so orally at a February 5, 1998, hearing. Specifically, the BCSE opines in its brief to this Court that,
the only proper and timely assertion of this [time limitation] defense would have been made PRIOR to the interception of the Workers' Compensation proceeds. Garry Stanley was sent a copy of the income withholding order sent to Workers' Compensation requesting the interception of said proceeds. The income withholding order included provisions for protest if Garry Stanley so desired.
Garry Stanley filed no protest to the income
withholding order. Therefore, Garry Stanley
neglected to assert the affirmative defense in a
The BCSE concludes that the doctrine of laches should apply to Mr. Stanley's failure to affirmatively assert the time limitation defense prior to the interception of the funds. We disagree.
This Court has held that [l]aches is a delay in the assertion of a known right
which works to the disadvantage of another, or such delay as will warrant the presumption
that the party has waived his right. Syllabus Point 2, Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123
W.Va. 608, 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941). We do not believe that any delay of Mr. Stanley's
assertion of the ten-year statute of limitation worked disadvantage to the BCSE or warranted
the presumption that Mr. Stanley waived his right. According to the BCSE, it issued its
income withholding order to the Workers' Compensation Division on March 11, 1997, and
sent a copy of the order to Mr. Stanley at the same time. On March 29, 1997, says the BCSE,
it received the intercept of $32,796.60 from the Workers' Compensation Division and
disbursed the money to Nada Stanley. This timetable indicates that Mr. Stanley had little
time in which to raise the time limitation defense before the money was received by the
BCSE and proffered to Ms. Stanley. Moreover, even if he had raised the defense prior to the
actual withholding, as noted above, the withholding would not have been stayed pending the
outcome of Mr. Stanley's challenge. Therefore, we do not believe that laches prevents Mr.
Stanley's assertion of the statute of limitation defense.
Moreover, we do not believe that Rule of Civil Procedure 8 prevented
consideration of Mr. Stanley's statute of limitation defense. Mr. Stanley's challenge to the
income withholding was not a response to a pleading filed against him in circuit court, as
contemplated by Rule 8. Rather, it was a response to an adverse administrative action. As
noted above, the withholding occurred in March 1997, and Mr. Stanley apparently first raised
the statute of limitation defense at a February 5, 1998, hearing. We conclude that Mr.
Stanley's raising of the statute of limitation defense was not so untimely as to constitute a
Finally, the BCSE avers that Mr. Stanley's unclean hands based, inter alia,
on his failure to pay past child support, including his failure to pay any portion of his $20,000
social security lump sum award, should prevent him from collecting any alleged overpayment
from the BCSE. We find no merit in this argument. While this Court certainly does not
condone Mr. Stanley's failure to meet his child support obligations, this failure did not
prevent Nada Stanley and the BCSE from tolling the ten-year limitation period pursuant to
W.Va. Code § 38-3-18. As a judgment debtor, Mr. Stanley enjoyed the same right as any
other judgment debtor to avail himself of the statute of limitation defense. Accordingly, we
reject the BCSE's challenges of the circuit court's application of the ten-year statute of
limitation to Mr. Stanley's child support arrearages.
We conclude that the Board of Risk and Insurance Management had a statutory
duty to purchase or contract for insurance to provide coverage for all of the DHHR's
activities and responsibilities.
(See footnote 14)
Further, the DHHR has a responsibility to refund to an
obligor money collected in excess of what is owed by the obligor. Due to Mr. Stanley's
successful assertion of the statute of limitation on the execution of judgments, it has been
determined that the DHHR collected from Mr. Stanley in excess of what he owed.
Therefore, Mr. Stanley is entitled to a refund of his overpayment of child support arrearages
under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage for loss on account of
the DHHR's activities and responsibilities.
(See footnote 15)
The BCSE asserts, however, that it is not liable to Mr. Stanley for the
repayment of any funds because it is merely a collection agency acting as a conduit between
the obligor and the obligee. Therefore, when it acts in good faith upon valid orders, it is not
liable for repayment to an obligor when an overpayment results. Again, we disagree.
The Legislature has provided procedures to obligors whereby they can contest income withholding, see W.Va. Code § 48-14-405(8) - (11) (Supp. 2001), and it also has directed in W.Va. Code § 48-14-407(b) (2002), (See footnote 16) that [t]he [West Virginia Support Enforcement] commission shall, by administrative rule, establish procedures for promptly refunding to obligors amounts which have been improperly withheld[.] According to the Child Advocate Office Policy and Procedural Manual, Section 08010.20.20, effective November 1, 1993, which is incorporated by reference as a Legislative Rule,
In an income withholding case, if the overpayment to the caretaker resulted from a situation where the source of income withheld more than the allowable amount for the month or for whatever reason an amount was improperly withheld from the obligor's income, the [Child Advocate Office] must arrange to promptly refund the amount that was improperly withheld.
If too much money was paid to the caretaker as a result of such a situation, the overpayment must be recovered from the caretaker. (See 8010.20.05 and 8010.20.10). However, the [Child Advocate Office] will not wait for the caretaker to repay before paying the obligor, but will go ahead and refund the money to the obligor when the error is discovered. (Emphasis added.).
It is clear from the above that the Legislature has manifested an intent that the BCSE repay funds which were improperly withheld from an obligor's income. It is equally clear that the BCSE has recognized that it has such a duty. Moreover, simple fairness dictates that when a government entity exercises its considerable power to obtain a portion of an obligor's income through force of law, it cannot escape all responsibility when its actions result in an overpayment by the obligor. Accordingly, we conclude that the BCSE is liable to an obligor for repayment when it improperly withholds funds from his or her income.
In sum, we find that the circuit court properly applied the ten-year limitation
period for the execution of judgments. We also find that the DHHR, of which the BCSE is
a part, is a State agency which enjoys constitutional immunity from suit. However, because
the Pittsburgh Elevator exception to constitutional immunity applies, we find that Mr.
Stanley can collect the amount he overpaid from the DHHR under and up to the limits of the
State's liability coverage. Finally, we conclude that the DHHR breached its duty to pay the
proceeds of the Workers' Compensation intercept to the proper persons.
For the reasons set forth above, the April 27, 2001, order of the circuit court is affirmed.
to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of execution,
a writ of suggestee execution and such other writs as are provided by law.
The procedure on execution and other such final process, in proceedings
supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid
of execution or such other final process shall be in accordance with the practice
and procedure prescribed by the laws of the State existing at the time the
remedy is sought, subject to the following qualifications: (1) A writ of execution
shall be made returnable not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days after
issuance, as directed by
the person procuring issuance of the writ; and (2)
an answer to a summons issued in a suggestion proceeding shall be served
upon the plaintiff within 20 days after service of the summons; and (3) a
return on a writ of suggestee execution shall be made forthwith on the expiration
of one year after issuance of the writ.
an answer to a summons issued in a suggestion proceeding shall be served upon the plaintiff within 20 days after service of the summons; and (3) a return on a writ of suggestee execution shall be made forthwith on the expiration of one year after issuance of the writ.