J. Michael Benninger, Esq.
Wilson, Frame, Benninger & Metheney, PLLC
Morgantown, West Virginia
Rebecca Oblak Zuleski, Esq.
Furbee, Amos, Webb & Critchfield, PLLC
Morgantown, West Virginia
Attorneys for Appellants
Larry W. Blalock, Esq.
Whitney G. Clegg, Esq.
Jackson & Kelly, PLLC
New Martinsville, West Virginia
Attorneys for Appellees
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
JUSTICE McGRAW concurs, in part, and dissents, in part, and
reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
A motion for summary
judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue
of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify
the application of the law. Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty &
Surety Company v. Federal Insurance Company of New York, 148 W. Va.
160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).
This is an appeal by Holly
O. Bine and Shirley Bine, his wife, from an order of the Circuit Court of Marshall
County granting Bayer, Inc., and other defendants, summary judgment in an action
brought by the Bines growing out of the firing of Holly O. Bine by his employer,
Bayer, Inc.See footnote 1 1
In their complaint, the Bines had claimed that Holly O. Bine's termination
was wrongful in that Bayer, Inc., had failed to follow disciplinary procedures
contained in its own employee handbook. They also had claimed that he had been
defamed and had been placed in false light, that he had been subjected to intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and that he had not received termination pay
in a timely manner as required by West Virginia's Wage Payment and Collection
Act, W. Va. Code 21-5-1, et seq. On appeal, the Bines claim that
the circuit court erred in entering summary judgment inasmuch as there were
material questions of fact remaining in the case at the time summary judgment
In 1994, Bayer, Inc., installed
a stationary video surveillance system on the parking lot of its New Martinsville,
West Virginia, plant after receiving a report of vandalism on that lot. Subsequently,
an hourly security guard, equipped with a hand held video camera, was also stationed
on the lot.
In the early hours of September
16, 1994, the security guard observed an individual walking in a suspicious
manner around a vehicle which had previously been vandalized. The security guard
believed that the individual was Holly O. Bine. A subsequent investigation showed
that the vehicle had been freshly scratched.
The incident was reported,
and the management of Bayer, Inc., proceeded to review the incident. Management
concluded that Mr. Bine was in fact the individual who had scratched the vehicle
and informed Mr. Bine of this conclusion. Mr. Bine denied that he had damaged
the vehicle and asked the identity of the guard and asked for an opportunity
to review the videotape. Management denied these requests and directed Mr. Bine
to take a leave of absence while a further investigation was conducted. Subsequently,
Mr. Bine's employment was terminated effective October 15, 1994.
Following his termination, Mr.
Bine and his wife instituted the civil action involved in the present proceeding.
As has been previously indicated, they claimed that Mr. Bine had not been accorded
the benefit of the procedures contained in Bayer, Inc.'s, employee handbook. They
also claimed that Bayer, Inc., had defamed Holly O. Bine, had presented him in
a false light, and had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him. Lastly,
they claimed that his final wages had not been paid in accordance with West Virginia's
Wage Payment and Collection Act.
After extensive discovery,
Bayer, Inc., and the other defendants moved for summary judgment in the action.
The circuit court took the motion under consideration and on September 10, 1999,
granted the relief sought. It is from that action that the present appeal is
This Court has indicated that
a summary judgment should be reviewed de novo. Painter v. Peavy,
192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). Further, the Court has indicated
that: A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is
clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning
the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law. Syllabus
Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Federal Insurance Company
of New York, 148 W. Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). Lastly, the Court has stated that in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact in a case, the Court will construe the facts in the light most favorable
to the losing party. Alpine Property Owners Association v. Mountaintop Development
Company, 179 W. Va. 12, 365 S.E.2d 57 (1987).
One of the Bines' principal
assertions in the present appeal is that Bayer, Inc., issued an employee handbook
which detailed procedures to be followed when employee discipline or discharge
was contemplated. They claim that Bayer, Inc., improperly and wrongfully failed
to follow the procedures specified in the handbook in terminating Mr. Bine's
employment. Bayer, Inc., on the other hand, claims that Holly O. Bine was an
at-will employee and that since this was the situation, he could legally be
fired without being afforded the benefit of the handbook procedure.
In Cook v. Heck's, Inc.,
176 W. Va. 368, 342 S.E.2d 453 (1986), this Court stated that in the realm
of the employer-employee relationship, West Virginia is an at-will
jurisdiction, that is, that, in the absence of some contractual or legal provision
to the contrary, an employment relationship may be terminated, with or without
cause, at the will of either the employer or the employee. The Cook case,
however, proceeded to hold that a provision in an employee handbook may alter the at-will nature of an employment relationship
if there is a definite promise in the handbook by the employer not to discharge
the covered employee except for specified reasons. The Court specifically stated:
The inclusion in the handbook of specified discipline for violations of particular rules accompanied by the statement that the disciplinary rules constitute a complete list is prima facie evidence of an offer for a unilateral contract of employment modifying the right of the employer to discharge without cause.
176 W. Va. at 374, 342 S.E.2d at 459.
In the later case of Suter
v. Harsco Corporation, 184 W. Va. 734, 403 S.E.2d 751 (1991), the Court
reiterated the principle that a handbook provision may alter an at-will relationship,
but stated further that: An employer may protect itself from being bound
by any and all statements in an employee handbook by placing a clear and prominent
disclaimer to that affect in the handbook itself. Syllabus Point 5, Suter
v. Harsco Corporation, id.
Although the Bines in the present case claim that the handbook issued to Mr. Bine altered the at-will nature of Mr. Bine's employment, and implicitly established that Mr. Bine's employment could only be terminated by the procedures established in the handbook, the record shows that the handbook issued to Mr. Bine contained a prominent disclaimer indicating that nothing in the handbook was intended to alter Mr. Bine's at-will employment relationship. Specifically, the handbook stated:
The manual is not intended to
alter the employment-at-will relationship in any way. Moreover, it neither creates
an employment contract or term nor limits the reasons or procedures for termination
or modification of the employment relationship.
In light of the fact that
Suter v. Harsco Corporation, id., holds that a disclaimer such
as the one used by Bayer, Inc., relieves the employer from being bound by the
statements in the handbook, this Court concludes that Bayer, Inc., was not bound
by disciplinary procedures contained in its handbook when it discharged Mr.
Bine and that the Bines' claim that Mr. Bine was improperly discharged because
Bayer, Inc., did not follow the procedures in the handbook is without merit.See
footnote 2 2
As has previously been indicated,
the Bines also claim that Mr. Bine was defamed and presented in a false light
by Bayer, Inc., when he was discharged.
In Crump v. Beckley Newspapers,
Inc., 173 W. Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983), this Court explained that
to have a defamation claim, a plaintiff must show that false and defamatory statements
were made against him, or relating to him, to a third party who did not have a
reasonable right to know, and that the statements were made at least negligently
on the part of the party making the statements, and resulted in injury to the
plaintiff. The elements were summarized in Syllabus Point 1 of Crump v. Beckley
Newspapers, Inc., id., as follows:
The essential elements for a successful defamation action by a private individual are (1) defamatory statements; (2) a nonprivileged communication to a third party; (3) falsity; (4) reference to the plaintiff; (5) at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (6) resulting injury.
Mr. Bine, in the present case, takes the position that he had not vandalized a fellow employee's vehicle as claimed by Bayer, Inc., and that any assertion that he did is false. The record further indicates that at the time Mr. Bine was terminated, rumors began spreading among Mr. Bine's fellow employees.See footnote 3 3 To quash these rumors, Bayer, Inc., apparently notified certain employees that Mr. Bine had been engaged in vandalism. On appeal, the Bines take the position that the spreading of this false information constituted defamation.
In this Court's view, the
Bines' claim of defamation raises issues of material fact, or at least questions
which merit further factual inquiry. As indicated in Crump v. Beckley Newspapers,
Inc., id., for defamation to exist, there must be a false statement. It
is the clear import of Mr. Bine's statements that he did not commit the vandalism
charged. Further, the deposition testimony of certain witnesses suggests that
Mr. Bine could not, because of his character, have committed the vandalism charged.
On the other hand, certain evidence adduced by Bayer, Inc., suggests that he
was the culprit. An additional question is whether Bayer, Inc., was privileged
or justified in spreading the charge of vandalism, if false, among its employees.
Where there are questions of this
type, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Federal Insurance Company of New
York, supra, indicates that summary judgment is improper.
Two additional claims asserted
by the Bines are that Bayer, Inc., placed Mr. Bine in a false light and that
Bayer, Inc., intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him. In Crump
v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., supra, the Court discussed false light claims
and stated in Syllabus Point 12: Publicity which unreasonably places another
in a false light before the public is an actionable invasion of privacy.
The Court also indicated in Syllabus Point 14 that a plaintiff in a false light
case may not recover unless the false light in which he was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.
As in the case of the defamation
claim, this Court believes that there is question of fact as to whether or not
Bayer, Inc., truly or falsely accused Mr. Bine of vandalizing a vehicle. The
spreading of such information, if false, could constitute a valid false light
claim. However, as previously indicated, in this Court's view, the truth or
falsity of the charge remains a factual issue in the case. Where there is such
an issue, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Federal Insurance
Company of New York, supra, holds that summary judgment is improper.
In Syllabus Point 3 of Travis
v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 202 W. Va. 369, 504 S.E.2d 419 (1998), this
Court examined what was necessary to establish an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, such as the one asserted by the Bines in the present case. The
In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the defendant's conduct was atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme and outrageous as to exceed the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted with the intent to inflict emotional distress, or acted recklessly when it was certain or substantially certain emotional distress would result from his conduct; (3) that the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; and, (4) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
As has previously been suggested, this Court believes that there is some question of fact as to whether Mr. Bine did, in fact, vandalize a fellow employee's vehicle and some question as to whether the dissemination of information that he had been terminated because of such conduct was justified or privileged. The Court believes that the record as developed fails to show conclusively either that Bayer, Inc., did intentionally or recklessly inflict emotional distress as laid out in Travis v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., id., or that it did not. Again, under such circumstances, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Federal Insurance Company of New York, supra, would suggest that summary judgment is inappropriate.
The Bines' final claim in
the present appeal is that the court erred in entering summary judgment on the
appellants' Wage Payment and Collection Act claim. Bayer, Inc., asserts that
all wages due Mr. Bine were paid in a timely fashion as contemplated by the
Wage Payment and Collection Act after Mr. Bine was dismissed. Mr. Bine claims
the contrary. Copies of checks apparently given to Mr. Bine are attached as
exhibits to the documents filed in the present case. However, the copies are
so illegible that this Court cannot tell when they were issued and, as a consequence,
it is impossible for this Court to examine the factual basis of the appellants'
claim that summary judgment was improperly entered on that point. In view of
this, this Court believes that it cannot rule that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment on the Wage Payment and Collection Act claim.
In light of all the above,
the judgment of the Circuit Court of Marshall County as it relates to the Bines'
wrongful discharge claims and their Wage Payment and Collection Act claim, should
be affirmed, and that judgment should be reversed insofar as it relates to the
defamation, false light and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
On remand, the circuit court should proceed with the development of the case
on the defamation, false light and intentional infliction of emotional distress
For the reasons stated, the judgment
of the Circuit Court of Marshall County is affirmed in part, and reversed in part,
and this case is remanded for further development.
After we had had our staff meeting that Wednesday, we were_our approach was, we weren't going to publicize anything on this. Holly was on inactive status until otherwise. I was quite upset at that staff meeting from some of the people that were spreading rumors. There were some rumors being
spread. I don't remember all the different people involved.
At another point, he testified:
And that it wasn't an easy situation for anyone, but we had to work through it and that I was informing them because I was tired of the rumors. I did not want them to go any further with it. It was to help them themselves come to grips with what was going on and get control back in the department because there was a lot of confusion. And that's as far as it went.